

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
Bureau of Agricultural Economics

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A STUDY OF THE METHODS OF MOBILIZING RURAL PEOPLE FOR WAR EMERGENCIES  
KERN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1/

SUMMARY

Organizational Structure

Leadership for bringing Kern County's rural population into an organized wartime effort has been undertaken mainly by the USDA War Board, the Extension Service, and the County Defense Council. The War Board had to assume responsibility for handling farm-labor problems after the Farm Labor Subcommittee of the Kern County Agricultural Planning Committee had failed. In doing this it established the Central Labor Advisory Council. The Extension Farm Advisor, in addition to his War Board duties, assisted the county fire department in organizing volunteer crews of farm fire fighters, acted as chairman of the County Defense Council's Air Raid Precautions and Blackout Committee; and mobilized volunteers for the State Militia. He has frequently made the facilities of his office available to other agencies conducting wartime programs that involve action by rural people.

The full complement of defense activities as advocated by the State Council of Defense was instituted by the County Defense Council, which has jurisdiction over all of Kern County except Bakersfield. Responsibility for each defense function in all possible instances has been placed under those legally constituted units of government that have related peacetime functions. The County Sheriff, for example, is in charge of the air-raid warden system and the aircraft warning service. The State and County Fire Department has responsibility for the several types of volunteer auxiliaries. Public Health authorities have an expanded first-aid program. Price-control education and scrap collections, on the other hand, by reason of the absence of related functions in the peacetime governmental structure, are necessarily conducted by newly instituted branches of county government or by volunteer effort.

Efforts to Implement Agricultural Production

Popular anxiety regarding farm-labor shortages prevailed during 1942 but the county's favorable location in regard to supplies of transient labor and early season successes by the U. S. Employment Service in mobilizing local volunteer workers precluded the imperativeness of an effective farm-labor committee. This was fortunate for it was not until early fall that effectiveness in either structure or function of a farm-labor planning group materialized. By then the subcommittee on farm labor, organized in

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January 1942 as an adjunct to the County Agricultural Planning Committee, had proved a failure. Its 35 members representing commodity groups, geographic areas, and public agencies attempted to secure complete farmer participation through a block-system type of organization. Through this, a labor-requirement survey was undertaken but was never completed except for one community. The chief reasons this committee did not make good were: confused governmental sponsorship of organized farm-labor activities and consequent lack of administrative responsibility for directing the committee; lack of farmer leadership; heterogeneous interests among committee membership; initial overemphasis on committee structure without devising a work program of sufficient significance to stimulate the membership.

In order to satisfy the mounting preharvest clamor for increased governmental assistance in procuring labor and to fill the gap vacated by the Farm Labor Subcommittee, the U.S.D.A. War Board in midsummer assumed responsibility for agricultural labor planning. Its device was the Central Labor Advisory Council. This Council consulted with commodity groups on labor requirements, negotiated revisions in local school calendars, and in various ways publicized local volunteer mobilization. In contrast to the laborious and ineffective registration process first attempted by the U.S. Employment Service to obtain volunteer agricultural workers the Council now mobilized 1,200 school-age youths and women by means of a 3-day press and radio campaign, to fill an order placed by some fruit farms. Their use of this supply is a striking example of the type of labor management necessary to handle inexperienced help.

The statistical data secured by interview from a sample population disclosed a psychological bias among farmers against the use of emergency sources of farm labor and reflected the ineffectiveness of early-season labor planning. Growers continued to rely upon customary sources of labor --local contractors, transients, and regular local workers. Farmers had made few plans for labor-sharing arrangements.

#### Civilian Defense Activities

Kern County's air-raid warning organization, with the exception of oil field areas, is set up as a block system. Over 1,000 junior air-raid wardens operate in the county. Organization and planning responsibility rests with the Defense Council's Air Raid Precaution and Blackouts Committee. The County Sheriff has county-wide operational responsibility, and the local ranking law-enforcement officer (chief of police, constable, or deputy sheriff) has this responsibility locally. An exception to this policy occurred in the Wasco community where the American Legion's peacetime disaster-relief organization was given blanket authority for air-raid warning activities. Responsibility for protecting the environs of oil fields and oil-processing plants has been assigned to the plant managers who use company personnel for the various warden responsibilities.

The Air Raid Precaution and Blackouts Committee has permitted a high degree of autonomy on the part of local administrative officers of the air-raid warden system. This explains the several local variations in an apparently rigid and uniform system and displays a weakness in over-all administration. Delano, for example, has a fully developed program in the urban area



but none in the farming areas. Responses to test questions in this rural area confirm the lack of an energetic air-raid warden program (only 2 of 23 rural people tested knew that they did not have an air-raid warden). Responsibility for this lies with organizational leadership and not with public apathy, as the same group showed a higher degree of awareness in reference to volunteer fire companies (48 percent) than any of the other communities. In contrast, by comparing scores of the Arvin community with the other three sample communities, for each emergency activity tested the uniformly low percentage of awareness implies a negligent public.

Selective factors in air-raid warden coverage other than the foregoing are absent. Comparative data on awarenesses of farmers and nonfarmers, foreign-born and native-born, men and women, or organizational members and nonmembers did not reveal any significant differences. Absence of these selective factors, in contrast to San Joaquin County's excellent Farm Bureau air-raid system, can be attributed in part to the organization of defense activities as units independent of any special interest group.

All fire companies outside Bakersfield have long been integrated into one system and four groups of auxiliaries have been organized for emergency work.

(1) School boys (1,250) organized into patrols of 8 to 10 have been trained in the rudiments of forest-fire fighting through cooperative efforts of the County Fire Department and the U.S. Forest Service.

(2) Oil-company employees (250) volunteered and were trained to fight oil fires exclusively.

(3) Auxiliaries (500 men) to local fire companies under the Civilian Defense program have been trained. The turn-over of personnel has been large, however, necessitating several local reorganizations of this activity.

(4) Farm-fire fighting crews were organized by the Extension Service and directed by the county fire department. The areas served by each of the 16 fire-department substations provide the basic geographic distribution of the 316 volunteers involved. These areas are subdivided into 123 sectors each having a farm-fire fighter crew of 7 or 8. Nearly all of the farm-fire fighters so far have worked at fires. The educational effect of this program undoubtedly helped to reduce the number of fires during the summer of 1942.

Little publicity has attended this expansion of the fire-fighting service which partially explains the uniformly low awarenesses scored by the sample population in each community. Identification of the presence or absence of a farm-fire fighting crew was more common than knowledge of a local fire captain.

Less regional variation in awareness of this activity was found. Members of farm-operators' families were more familiar with it than nonfarmers.

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Nationality differences were insignificant. Women were less informed than men.

A county salvage committee has replaced independent participation of agencies in scrap-collection activities. A chairman, paid from scrap revenues, has appointed volunteer chairmen for each of 17 communities. Salvage depots and salvage wardens are the instruments of collection.

### Findings

(1) The maintenance of all organizational control in official or quasi-official hands has prevented factional or jurisdictional feelings from hindering the emergency activities.

(2) The activities of the special defense organization--the Civilian Defense Council--tend to reach all classes of the population whereas a group developed by the Extension Service are likely, out of long habit, to limit their influence to farm operators only.

(3) The loose organization of the air-raid warden system, allowing much local initiative, makes for exceptionally good organization where the leaders display intensive interest and initiative, but, on the other hand, may result in complete failure or poor response if good leadership is lacking.

(4) The failure to institutionalize regular sharing customs--both of farm labor and farm machinery--suggests that organizational activity has not proceeded as far or as successfully as possible. A minority of farmers appear to be ahead of the governmental officials and farm leaders who have failed to stimulate and increase such cooperative efforts.

(5) Awareness scores of various activities by the absence of any consistent pattern display nothing inherent in type-of-farming area or in occupation making for such awareness. Where evidence of greater awareness among certain groups appears, the causes seem to be either that one group has more interest in the matter, or that more effort has been made to reach it, or that both are true.

(6) The scores reveal that a block organization, with the resultant personal contacts, makes for considerably greater awareness. Not only does the relatively higher proportion of correct answers on the air-raid warden question indicate this, but also the consistently better scores of those who were visited by their wardens. Yet it must be remembered that this is achieved at a relatively high expenditure of effort.

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## ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

### Agricultural Agencies

War emergency activities in Kern County have been developed by several different agencies. Those most greatly affecting the rural population are the County USDA War Board and the Extension Service. The War Board has conducted a program to alleviate the problems created by the curtailed supply of farm workers, has undertaken to pass upon priority requests for certain farm equipment, and has publicized defense and other emergency activities among the farming people.

The Extension Farm Advisor, besides being a member of the War Board, assisted in the organization of fire-fighting units and, with the help of the Home Demonstration Agent, has carried on educational programs to acquaint farm people with methods of fire protection. He has served as chairman for the Air Raid Warden Committee in the County Civilian Defense Council. In accordance with the State-wide Extension program he has been responsible for the organization of units of the State Militia throughout the county.

The Kern County Defense Council appointed the County Agricultural Commissioner as chairman of its standing committee on agricultural resources and production. His committee of 28 men represents all the important commodities grown in the county, the three major farm organizations, the War Board, the Extension Service, and the Employment Service. This committee has apparently found little to do. Early in 1942 it held several discussions with potato growers regarding the procurement of bags, and it assisted in the evacuation of Japanese. The Commissioner's office has furnished desired information to the War Board relating to the county's agricultural production. But there is no record of any recent meetings of this committee and several people interviewed felt that it has ceased to function. Although considerable jurisdictional confusion existed earlier in 1942 between the committee and the War Board, this has apparently been settled by the inactivity of the Agricultural Resources and Production Committee.

### Civilian Defense Council

Civilian defense activities were set up consistent with the State-wide pattern of defense council organization. There is one council for the city of Bakersfield and another for the remainder of the county. The County Civilian Defense Council organized, with the Farm Advisor's assistance, a rural air-raid warning system, functionally responsible to the County Sheriff. With the assistance of the public health authorities, first-aid stations were established in eight places outside of Bakersfield. Special fire-fighting groups have been organized in the smaller towns of the county, though these do not service the open country. Committees have been set up under the Defense Council on the following activities: Agricultural, air-raid precaution and blackouts, building and safety, communications, fire, health, law and order, legal, library, personnel, public relations and information, railroad, schools, streets and highways, motor transportation, utilities, welfare, and evacuation. Usually a committee has as its chairman that county official who is normally responsible for related activities.



Legally authorized agencies have assumed the major responsibility for defense activities. Among the most active have been the Sheriff and State and County Fire Department officials. The Sheriff, besides being responsible for the air-raid warning control center, has devoted considerable attention to the aircraft-warning service. The latter includes, in Kern County, a series of lookout posts serving the Army in order to detect unauthorized airplane flights. The State and County Fire Departments through the many branch offices in the county have developed and trained several volunteer fire companies. Besides the farm fire crews established in conjunction with the Agricultural Extension Service it has set up high-school auxiliary fire fighters, has had a program for training oil-company employees to control oil fires, and with the County Defense Council has developed auxiliary firemen in the smaller towns.

## WARTIME PRODUCTION MEASURES

### Farm Labor Activities

Kern County farmers have been much concerned with getting farm workers this year. According to those interviewed, however, the problem has been less acute in this county than elsewhere because of the geographical location. Kern County is closer to the Los Angeles labor market than any other valley county and is the entryway for migrants from the Southwestern States. Nevertheless, anxiety has been prevalent.

Attempts were made to set up a farm labor subcommittee under the auspices of the Kern County Agricultural Planning Committee. At present, the Farm Labor Subcommittee is inactive and farm-labor functions have been undertaken by another group specifically affiliated with the County War Board. This, the Central Labor Advisory Committee, works closely with the U. S. Employment Service and with important commodity groups in the county.

Knowledge of prior developments is essential to an understanding of how the Central Labor Advisory Committee came into existence. The Farm Labor Subcommittee had a membership of 35, composed of agency representatives and farmers distributed geographically throughout the county and rather adequately representing the various important commodities grown. The Farm Labor Subcommittee decided upon community committees which would stimulate action among farm operators consistent with suggestions issued by the State War Board and the State Farm Labor Committee. To do this, members of the County Farm Labor Subcommittee were to appoint committees of about 15 men in each community after it had been divided into districts. These appointees were to be selected to make complete geographic coverage of the communities. In addition, each community committee member was instructed to subdivide his district and enlist the active participation of other farmers in pursuing the committee's work. By so doing, each district leader had working with him from 2 to 6 men, each specifically responsible for contact work among about 5 other farm operators. This organizational plan constituted what is commonly called a block system, in this case for the specific function of securing action on farm-labor problems.



The only activity undertaken through this block system was a survey of labor requirements. Only in the Delano community was this survey ever completed. The Delano community committee chairman was so concerned in developing a constructive farm-labor program that he secured complete coverage of every farm in the community. From the standpoint of effecting a strong organization throughout the county it was unfortunate that there were not more men like the Delano chairman on other community committees.

Among agricultural leaders in the county, the Farm Labor Subcommittee is now considered defunct although no official pronouncement of its death has been made. Several individuals in Kern County gave reasons for the disintegration of this block organization. There was never any common understanding as to which public agency was responsible for it. This confusion derives from the fact that in the spring of 1942 the State Agricultural Planning Committee, parent organization to all county farm labor subcommittees, and the governmental program under which it operates were discontinued. Sponsorship for farm-labor problems was shifted to the State War Boards and with corresponding shifts implied in the counties, but the Kern County War Board never adopted the Farm Labor Subcommittee. At about the same time the Employment Service was trying to augment its agricultural-labor-placement program yet its relationships to the Farm Labor Subcommittee were never strengthened.

Lack of definite administrative responsibility for the organization and of precise agreements on relationship among agencies dealing with the farm-labor problems in Kern County created weaknesses in the Subcommittees. The local agricultural leaders became confused about lines of responsibility, and they made no efforts to hold the organization together. The Farm Labor Subcommittee had relied entirely upon the initiative of farmer members in setting up community organizations and this initiative was never properly assumed. Some persons interviewed in Kern County also thought that the Subcommittee's composition was inadequate to handle farm-labor problems. All commodity groups in the county were represented but as the growers of different commodities do not have the same problems at the same time, the Committee had no unity of interest. As one man put it, "You can't expect the beet growers to be particularly concerned about whether the grape growers have labor or not, especially since a different type of labor is needed by the beet growers." It is also worth noting that the activity first undertaken by the Farm Labor Committee (the survey) was not in itself much of an incentive to keep an organization together. A more dynamic program at the outset might have strengthened the organization and lead to its perpetuation. Incidentally, the labor-survey data were never used.

As the Farm Labor Subcommittee became inactive the War Board was forced to take over more and more responsibility for the farm-labor problem. After considering and rejecting a plan to establish committees representing the several important commodity groups in the county, the War Board set up the Central Labor Advisory Committee, consisting of 9 men. Seven of these are farmers who are well-known in their communities and who grow different important commodities; a bank president and a newspaper man represent business interests. Inclusion of the latter, it was felt, permitted the group to maintain a more objective viewpoint. The Central Labor Advisory Committee was



established to serve two major functions: To advise the War Board of the existence and nature of labor requirements, and to act as a public relations group both in mobilizing volunteers and in negotiating with officials empowered to change policies (for example, school administrators) which might assist in meeting labor needs. In pursuit of these ends the Advisory Committee has at times met with representative beet and grape growers, seeking their opinions on labor conditions in those commodities. They have brought about changes in the usual school calendar, adjusting it to the seasonal requirements for farm labor. The Farm Bureau Federation had previously failed to secure a postponement of school opening. The Advisory Committee, at the time of field work, was encouraging local chambers of commerce to organize agricultural committees which in turn would mobilize urban residents for farm work.

An attempt to register adult volunteer workers in Kern County was made through the air-raid warden service in Bakersfield but the results were unsatisfactory. Of 10,000 registration cards distributed, only 750 were returned. The Employment Service believes that the registration technique is not a good one. It involves too many mechanical operations with poorer results than can be achieved through more generalized but less costly publicity techniques. For example, 1,200 youths were secured within 3 days in response to radio and newspaper publicity that requested young people to work in the harvest. After they had had "a taste of 45 cents an hour on a fruit ranch many more were clamoring for the same kind of jobs." On the other hand, the registration of school children which had previously been conducted through the schools brought fewer than 500 out of a possible 5,500 youths. The Employment Service believed the importance of the registration activity was not sufficiently realized by the teachers who merely went through the mechanical operation of registering students without making an intensive emotional appeal. The Employment Service thinks there is an enormous reservoir of potential labor among urban people which it has not yet been necessary to use and that the chief obstacle to its use is the unwillingness of farmers to accept and train this type of labor. The experience with school-age workers on the mentioned fruit ranch was very successful. After a half dozen troublesome students were dismissed, the plum harvest was completed without loss and at a stabilized wage rate. This was due primarily to the fact that this rancher was willing to train and use the young workers to the best advantage.

One instance of judicious use of farm labor came to attention in Kern County. Five potato growers hired a crew of 23 laborers who worked consecutively for 6 weeks on their several farms. The workers completed the harvest for each of these operators; crop losses were avoided and the laborers had full-time employment at a fair wage. In general the participating farmers were well satisfied and expect to continue this cooperative method of harvesting. Other similar groups exist in the county, but their appearance is sporadic and no systematic effort has been made to extend similar plans throughout the county.

The Farm Advisor is a firm believer in the use of mailing lists to carry information to farmers. He has a reputation among California Farm Advisors for systematically perfecting his lists to insure complete and appropriate coverage. In connection with the farm-labor situation he used his lists to circulate suggestions on labor housing, sanitary standards, labor transportation, and the use of school buses for transporting workers. For the community patterns that prevail in Kern County he believes this direct



mail technique of getting action from farmers is far better than the block system. With the exception of a few communities, such as Wasco and Shafter, there are too few resident farm operators to maintain a functioning block system.

The Pomona Grange Master and the County Farm Bureau Federation President have a standing invitation to participate in War Board meetings but they have both been somewhat perplexed as to what contribution they might make. It is probably safe to say that these two organizations have not yet visualized how they can assist the War Board efforts to carry through its program, and the War Board has not clarified their function.

Of the 55 farmers in the county from whom schedules were taken, 4 needed no labor and 2 had no plans for getting workers whatsoever (table 1). The remaining 49 farmers gave a total of 75 answers. Of these only 11 were indicative of any awareness that emergency measures were being taken to secure a labor supply. Four indicated sharing arrangements, 4 the use of volunteers or Mexicans, 2 that the labor subcommittee was active in getting workers, and 1 knew merely that a survey had been made by the Extension Service. Seven others referred to the U. S. Employment Service as their source of workers. Thirty-three indicated their dependence upon local sources of which only 2 planned to hire neighbors; 16 expected to get migrant workers; 8 had special arrangements with packing companies or others.

These data show clearly that for the most part the growers still expect to get their labor from the usual channels--local contractors, migrants, laborers in the community, and the like. It shows that very little thought has been given to developing unusual sources of workers or organizing groups of cooperating farmers to share the services of labor crews.

#### Machinery and Supplies

No information was obtained which shows that any innovations have been attempted in the handling of the more-or-less routine activities of the War Board. Farmers who need materials for which priorities are necessary make their applications directly to the War Board office and investigations are usually made by AAA personnel. Informal sharing of farm machinery is generally practiced throughout the county, according to the schedules taken. Forty-three of the 55 farms reported some arrangement of that sort with their neighbors. These were found in similar proportions in the 4 communities studied. No effort has been made to develop this generally established practice into an institution that would serve to reduce the need for additional farm equipment.

The Extension Service has distributed by mail much information as to the procedures involved in securing farm machinery and other supplies. It has especially advocated the construction of labor housing and has given all practicable assistance to farmers who are trying to do this.



Table 1.- Anticipated or actual sources of labor

Labor source	No of times	Proportion of	Proportion of
	mentioned	times mentioned	55 farmers interviewed <sup>1/</sup>
	<u>No.</u>	<u>Pct.</u>	<u>Pct.</u>
Emergency measures:			
Sharing systems	4	5	7
Emergency workers	4	5	7
Labor subcommittee <sup>2/</sup>	2	2	4
Extension Service Survey <sup>2/</sup>	1	1	2
Total emergency	11	14	—
Dependent on local labor:			
From towns	19	23	35
Local crew or contractor	7	9	13
In own camp	4	5	7
Neighbors	2	2	4
Total local	32	40	—
Dependent on migrants	16	20	36
Dependent on agencies:			
U. S. Employment Service	7	9	13
Private	1	1	2
Total	8	10	—
Special arrangements	8	10	15
No labor or no arrangement	6	7	11
Total responses	81	100	—

<sup>1/</sup> The proportion of farmers giving any single type of answer. Totals in this column would not be meaningful as more than one response was given by many farmers.

<sup>2/</sup> Indicates awareness of these programs and their possible solution to the labor problem; does not mean the farmer was depending upon the activity to supply his workers.



## PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

Air-Raid Warning System

The first and most far-reaching precautionary measures established in the county is the system of air-raid wardens. This service is under the Air-Raid Precaution and Blackouts Committee of the County Defense Council with the Farm Advisor as chairman. The personnel, however, is also directly responsible under emergency conditions to the Sheriff's office, where the control center is established. It may be stated parenthetically that the Farm Advisor was not chairman of the committee at the time of the organization of air-raid wardens and was not responsible for the development of the system or the choice of wardens.

In most communities of the county, the Deputy Sheriff is the responsible person in this warning system, though in one community, where there is no Deputy Sheriff, the American Legion took over this responsibility. The air-raid warning system is a hierarchical one based on geographical divisions and subdivisions. The county is divided into 15 zones, not including the city of Bakersfield; over each of these is a zone warden. Where the population is large enough to warrant, these zones are divided into precincts, and there are a total of 28 precincts within the 10 subdivided zones. A warden is in charge of each precinct. The zone or the precinct, as the case may be, is then subdivided into from 2 to as many as 60 sectors. The senior warden presides over the sectors. Each senior warden has subdivided his sector into smaller units and has charged the responsibility of each of these to a junior warden. There are 238 sectors, with a senior warden for each, while the number of junior wardens rises to more than a thousand, though not all of these are in rural areas. Persons serving in special capacities, such as directing traffic during an air-raid or acting as special messengers, are also entitled junior wardens. This entire structure has been illustrated in a mimeographed bulletin issued by the chief under the title, "Supplementary Instructions, No. 1."

A major characteristic of the organization in Kern County is that while apparently the organization is rather rigid and uniform, actually there is a high degree of local autonomy which has resulted in considerable local variation in the nature of the organizations. This variation shows up, as is later demonstrated, in the degree of awareness of precautionary measures in the several communities studied.

Responsibility for organizing activities in the communities technically devolves upon the chief law-enforcement officer of the area - the Chief of Police, or the Constable, or the Deputy Sheriff. These officers, already burdened with duties, have not always found it possible to serve in this new capacity, and this is perhaps responsible for the high degree of variation. In Wasco, for example, the air-raid warden system has been developed by the American Legion. In this community the Legion had a pre-existing plan for establishing a block organization to administer a disaster-relief program, and after war was declared, the Legion activated this organization. It was then brought under the Defense Council's county-wide plan and altered sufficiently to meet the needs of that system but the personnel has continued to be the same so Legionnaires remain in the more responsible positions. In Arvin, the oil fields constitute a unique problem so responsibility has been delegated to the plant managers. In one case an oil corporation established a precautionary system which was taken into the Civilian Defense Council organization. It has a radio-receiving set by which the air-raid warning signals can be obtained.



Similarly, the managers of large corporate farms throughout the county have been made senior wardens and are held responsible for the maintenance of blackout and other precautionary measures among the laborers on their ranches. The FSA camp manager has taken on similar responsibility. These administrative persons have appointed junior air raid wardens from their more responsible and permanent workers. In all of these instances the normal channel of authority has been brought into use for these emergency measures.

The local autonomy may be held partly responsible for the fact that the farming areas of the county do not have complete coverage. While the city of Delano has a fully developed air-raid warning service, the rural areas surrounding it are not so protected. So far as could be learned lack of interest on the part of the responsible law-enforcement officers is the immediate cause.

Very little training has been required of the air-raid wardens. First-aid courses have been offered in some areas but the wardens were not required to take them, and most have not done so. Apparently some regional variation exists in the degree of other training required. Some information on handling incendiary bombs has been disseminated. One warden said that he has been to two classes on incendiary bombs and that the fire department has three times sent out educational films on the handling of bombs. Aside from such special training there have been fairly regular warden meetings. In Arvin, meetings were held once a month; in Buttonwillow fewer than a dozen meetings have been held to date. Two meetings have been held in Bakersfield for zone and precinct wardens but no information was obtained about the subjects covered.

There have been three county-wide tests of this system with varying success. One precinct warden said that everyone was covered in his rural area after 30 minutes. In Wasco, the first and third of these tests were efficiently handled but the second, which fell during the peak period of farming activity, received very poor response. These tests have all been pre-arranged and it is therefore probable that an unannounced emergency call would show a poorer degree of efficiency.

Each air-raid warden has presumably made at least one call on each of the farmers in his area. In January or February of 1942 they were requested to take around a bulletin containing information on precautionary measures. Actually, however, visits have not always been made. One warden explained that most of the people in his block were laborers and come and go frequently so there would be no point in calling on them in advance. On the other hand, another said he was already well acquainted with all the farmers in his block and it would be unnecessary to make a special call. A third apparently simply did not see any necessity for making such calls and did not consider it his duty. It was therefore not surprising that in the 80 schedules taken only 18 persons remembered visits by their air-raid wardens (table 2).

In addition to the above activities the Delano city air-raid wardens were called upon to make a farm-labor survey. Air-raid warden officials specifically rejected the suggestions that the wardens serve as minutemen for the war bond pledge drive of the early summer and that the system serve as a means of collecting scrap materials.



Table 2.- Number of remembered air-raid warden visits

	Number of schedules	Number remem- bering visit	Percent remem- bering visit	Total : Ave. visits reported:per person visits : replying
All persons:	80	18	22.5	23 1.28
Districts:				
Wasco	20	6	30.0	6 1.00
Arvin	20	2	10.0	4 2.00
Buttonwillow	17	10	58.8	13 1.30
Delano	23	0	0.0	0 0.00
Farmers	55	12	21.8	15 1.25
Nonfarmers	25	6	24.0	8 1.33
Nationality:				
American	67	13	19.4	17 1.31
Foreign born	13	5	38.4	6 1.20

Schedules taken from 80 farmers in Kern County were designed to elicit information on the awareness of war measures among the rural people. <sup>2/</sup> These persons were divided between the rural districts of Wasco, Arvin, Buttonwillow, and Delano, and while all are from the rural areas, 25 persons were not farm operators. <sup>3/</sup> Of the 80 persons interviewed, 43 (54 percent) either knew the name of their air raid warden or could indicate where he lived.

Considerable difference is shown in awareness between the several communities investigated. Delano, which had no rural air-raid wardens, showed only 2 correct answers out of 23 schedules ( a knowledge of the absence of an air-raid warden system was here considered a correct answer). Two communities showed a much higher degree of awareness. Sixteen of the 17 persons interviewed in Buttonwillow (94 percent) and 17 of the 20 persons interviewed in Wasco (85 percent), knew who their air-raid warden was. The Arvin district again showed a much lower degree of knowledge, with only 8 out of 20 persons (40 percent) giving correct answers. No other selective factors in awareness related to the air raid system are apparent in Kern County. Farmers and non-farmers had almost identical knowledge of their air-raid wardens. Foreign-born and native-born showed exactly the same proportion of persons knowing their wardens. There is likewise no significant difference between men and women. Thirteen persons of foreign birth were included in the schedule. The persons who were members of organizations, either special emergency defense

<sup>2/</sup> The results from these schedules are given in table 3.

<sup>3/</sup> Interviews were taken consecutively in the selected neighborhoods. Fifty-five persons were members of the households of farm operators. Of the remaining 25, 18 were farm laborers, 3 were other laborers, and 4 were either landlords or retired farmers. Nonfarmers were spread fairly evenly through the 4 communities, with 5 each in Buttonwillow and Delano, 7 in Wasco, and 8 in Arvin.



Table 3.- Awareness and knowledge of emergency measures

Persons reporting awareness or knowledge of														
Number : schedules :		Air raid : warden :		Fire : warden :		Volunteer : fire : : company :		Scrap col- : lection : : methods :		Means of ob- : taining : : priority :		Protest of : unfair : practices :		
No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	
All persons	20	100	43	54	15	19	29	36	23	29	13	16	5	6
Districts:														
Osasco	20	100	17	85	4	20	9	45	7	35	3	15	2	10
Arvin	20	100	8	40	1	5	3	15	1	5	1	5	0	0
Buttonwillow	17	100	16	94	3	18	6	35	3	18	5	29	2	12
Belano	23	100	2	9	7	30	11	48	12	52	4	17	1	4
Occupation:														
Farm	55	100	29	53	14	25	28	51	16	29	12	22	5	9
Nonfarm	25	100	14	56	1	4	1	4	7	28	1	4	0	0
Nationality:														
American	67	100	36	54	14	21	23	34	19	28	11	16	5	7
Foreign born	13	100	7	54	1	8	6	46	4	31	2	15	0	0
Sex:														
Male	45	100	25	56	12	27	23	51	16	36	11	24	3	7
Female	35	100	18	51	3	9	6	17	7	20	2	9	2	6
Membership:														
No membership	44	100	23	52	3	7	9	20	12	27	3	7	2	5
Defense or- ganization only	3	100	5	63	3	38	4	50	3	38	1	13	0	0
Membership in nondefense organization	20	100	15	54	9	32	16	57	7	29	9	32	3	11



units or regular associations, showed no higher knowledge of the air-raid system than did those who report no membership. The significance of actual visits by wardens to the homes of farmers in their districts is clearly disclosed by the schedule data (table 4). Of the 18 persons who remembered being visited by their wardens all knew who their air-raid warden is. Furthermore, the number of remembered visits shows the same pattern of variation between communities as the figures for knowledge of wardens. In Buttonwillow, 59 percent recalled that the warden had visited them, in Wasco 30 percent, and in Arvin 10 percent, while obviously no visits were made in Delano.

Results of the schedules suggest several important considerations. First, the organization of a defense system as a unit independent of any special-interest group eliminates selective factors in coverage. It is a justifiable conclusion that quasi-official sponsorship independent of special-interest organizations has brought an even spread of information irrespective of social status among farmers and nonfarmers, foreign and American born, men and women. The second point is that the tolerance for local autonomy in the development of the system has certain inherent good and bad features. Communities endowed with personnel showing an active interest in the problem exhibit a high degree of awareness and probably the response from these communities would be much poorer if a cut-and-dried system were established. On the other hand, such tolerance must be accountable for the fact that one community had absolutely no air-raid precaution for the rural districts, and another had only a very poorly organized system. It is significant that while the rural Delano area is without an air-raid warning system the residents displayed the highest degree of awareness of volunteer fire companies. With so much public acceptance of this measure responsibility for the absence of a rural air-raid warning system apparently rests directly upon the local officials rather than upon the people.

#### Fire Fighting Activities

Kern County has long had a highly organized and efficient fire-fighting system, with a budget ample to provide equipment throughout the county. All the fire companies outside of the city of Bakersfield are integrated into this system or have close working cooperative arrangements. It is therefore not surprising that an active emergency fire-fighting program has been developed. The program has been fourfold:

The first is the high-school auxilliary fire fighters. Under this program 1,250 high school boys were given instructions in fire fighting in a cooperative effort between the County Fire Department and the U. S. Forest Service. Each boy received 12 hours of training - 4 in the classroom and 8 in the field. These trainees were established as a reserve group to handle forest fires, in anticipation of incendiary bombings in the forests within the county. The boys were taught such activities as fire line construction and the setting up of fire camps. Volunteers who completed the course were given certificates. Aside from service on forest fires they gave much assistance to the farm fire crews during the summer of 1942. Those boys were organized into patrols of from 8 to 10, each with a patrol leader. When assistance was required, the dispatcher at the County Fire Department headquarters contacted the patrol leader or his alternate who in turn was responsible for mobilizing the patrol.



Table 4.- Awareness of emergency measures by persons remembering air raid warden's visits

	Number : schedules		Air raid : warden		Fire : warden		Volunteer : fire company		Scrap col- : lection		Means of ob- : taining		Protest of : unfair : prices	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Remembering	18	100	18	100	6	33	9	50	6	33	14	78	3	17
Not remembering	62	100	25	40	9	15	20	32	17	27	38	61	2	3



The second program of the fire department was to train oil-company employees in methods of handling oil fires. This was initiated in April 1942, when approximately 250 men were given 3 days of intensive training. Recruits for these crews were obtained from oil-company personnel who sent volunteers. The training these men received was highly specialized and an attempt was made to get adequate trained personnel in all places where oil is produced or handled. They are to serve only in their own locale and it is not desired that other volunteer fire fighters attempt to assist in fighting oil fires.

The third program of the fire department was carried on in conjunction with the County Defense Council. Five hundred auxiliary firemen were trained to serve as volunteer helpers in case of emergency in the towns throughout the county. This program has been less successful than the other three, and the turn-over of personnel has been so great that at the time the field study was made the fire department was attempting to reorganize the several fire companies under this unit.

The farm-fire crews, established cooperatively by the fire department and the Farm Advisor, represent the fourth activity undertaken by the fire department as an emergency war measure. These farm-fire crews are organized in a sort of block system. There are 16 districts, corresponding to the 16 substations of the County Fire Department. Each district is divided into from 1 to 17 sectors with a total of 123 such units. Over each sector there is a fire captain with a crew of 7 or 8 firemen. A total of 816 volunteer persons are active in this program. Special cooperation has been received from the major corporate farms maintaining permanent labor camps and from oil companies. In these cases the management has set up fairly elaborate equipment and drafted their labor force for the activity. The fire captains are expected to work in cooperation with the person in charge of the local station of the County Fire Department. Crew captains were selected in April 1942 by representatives of the Extension Service and the County Fire Department. These two representatives, with the local captain, then tentatively selected 12 to 24 persons. From these the final crew was established.

Each fire company is supposed to have had three training meetings in which they were taught how to handle grass fires and incendiary bombs. Apparently there is considerable variation in interest between different communities and some of them have not had their full complement of training. On the other hand, it is the practice in some areas to have regular meetings every month and an effort is made to have someone from the fire department visit the captain of each group at least that often. The County Fire Department believes that these contacts are necessary in order to maintain interest. The County has spent between \$5,000 and \$7,000 for equipment, consisting mostly of back pack pumps for these companies, and in many cases the farmers themselves have added to this equipment.

Many of the crews had functioned at the time of the field study. Some had been called out especially for fires in their areas, while others had worked on a voluntary basis in order to get experience. According to the Farm Advisor a majority of the personnel have actually worked on fires. He reports that fewer small fires cropped up during the summer of 1942 than was usually the case, and believes that this may be credited to the educational effect of establishing



farm-fire crews. This education works in two ways: First, the individual is more likely to be cautious in dealing with fire, and second, he is more likely to take responsible action when he discovers fire. The Home Demonstration Agent has instructed the farm women on feeding emergency meals to fire fighters and on methods of fire-proofing clothing.

Of the programs of the fire department, only that establishing auxiliary firemen in the cities is under the Defense Council.

Little specific statement was made as to local variation in the farm-fire fighting set-up, though it was intimated that some companies serve more adequately than others. Not much publicity has been given to the fire-fighting organization and there has been no attempt to have the captains or crew members visit all the farmers within their areas. For these reasons it is not surprising that only 15 of the 80 persons (19 percent) knew the name of their local fire captain, though 29 (36 percent) were aware of the existence of the voluntary farm-fire fighters. 4/ There was much less regional variation in awareness than there was in awareness of the air-raid warden system. As all of the communities investigated had similarly constituted fire-fighting crews, whereas not all had air-raid warning system, less variation is to be expected. The Arvin community showed consistently less awareness of the fire-fighting system than did the other communities. Members of farm operators' families were much more fully aware of the fire organization than were persons from other walks of life. Twenty-five percent of the farmers know their fire warden as against 4 percent of the nonfarm group, and 51 percent knew of the voluntary fire companies as against 4 percent. Nationality differences are not so marked, for while a larger proportion of American born knew their fire captain, fewer of them knew that there were volunteer fire companies. Again, women showed considerably less awareness of this program than did the men.

Seven of the 80 persons said they would call on the fire warden in case of fire, as against 64 who would call the regular fire department and 9 who either did not know or gave incorrect information. Although this cannot be considered a large proportion, it does indicate that the farm people are recognizing this group and learning to depend upon it.

Apparently the development of fire crews in the farming districts had been carried on with considerable success. The organization has served a very useful educational function and it has made easier the control of fires for the department itself. This is true despite the fact that no effort has been made to bring the knowledge of such fire-fighting organization to the total rural population. The close tie between the fire-fighting crews and the agricultural agencies has resulted in some failure to reach the nonfarming rural people.

#### First-Aid Activities

The Kern County Public Health Department had nurses' headquarters in the various communities throughout the county for some time before the present emergency. These public-health nurse centers are now first-aid stations to

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4/ See table 3, Ms. page 12, for this and following data.



serve in the event of hostilities. Stations have been established in Bakersfield, Taft, Delano, Shafter, Wasco, Tehachapi, Mojave, Buttonwillow, and Arvin. Each has a mobile unit. Besides the service of the public-health nurse, 1 or more doctors are on call in each of these places and a number of volunteer workers trained in first aid are available as ambulance corps workers.

This program was established under the Civilian Defense Council and is under the charge of the County Medical Director. The Red Cross assisted throughout, especially in first-aid training.

### State Militia

The Kern County Farm Advisor launched the drive to organize State Militia companies by using his mailing lists in presenting the program to rural people. He was particularly pleased with the results of acquainting prospective enrollees with the militia plan, especially as he had earlier been criticised for a relatively poor enrollment. Out of 9,000 sets of information on the militia mailed, 1,714 men were signed up in Kern County. No figures on the number of farm operators were obtained. Kern County was second only to Los Angeles County in total militia enrollees. The militia program was also presented through a series of meetings conducted by the Extension Service.

### OTHER MEASURES

#### Mailing-List Technique

It has been mentioned several times that the Extension Service in Kern County relies largely upon the direct-mail method for presenting information to rural people. The Farm Advisor has been a strong advocate of this method for years and is extremely pleased with the recent success. In past years he was criticised by his superiors for placing so much emphasis on this method, but he feels that with the curtailment of transportation facilities and with the augmented need for reaching rural people during the war his policy has been vindicated.

The Farm Advisor believes himself an authority on the direct-mail technique. He thinks that its successful use depends upon an established relationship between the Extension office and the rural residents, extending over several years. Therefore, good results from this method should not be expected at once, where it has not been effectively used before. He also believes that successful use of direct mail requires careful selection of both materials to be disseminated and recipients of the information. To illustrate this, he carries an active file of 6,000 cards. With about 2,000 farm operators in the county, each one is carried on about three lists. In this way the Farm Advisor is sure he approaches individual operators only on those subjects that interest them. By way of contrast, another county farm advisor in Southern California carries a mailing list of only about 2,500 names in a county where there are 7,000 or more operators.

The Farm Advisor keeps his mailing lists up to date by frequent revisions, aided by the postal officials. He says that surprisingly few mailed pieces are returned to his office; he attributes this to selective uses. An



indication of the effectiveness of this technique is contained in responses to letters sent by him advising the use of ammonia sulphate fertilizer. He checked with the supply houses almost immediately after sending these letters and found they had filled 275 orders.

### Price Ceiling Information

Recently the Farm Advisor circulated to every farm household in the county a 9-page pamphlet entitled, "The National Anti-inflation Program," prepared by State Extension Specialists and the local Extension personnel from data released by the Federal Extension Service. In addition, the anti-inflation program was presented to community gatherings throughout the county. The County Defense Council has established a Consumer Interest Committee with headquarters in the offices also occupied by the County Rationing Board. This committee's program was just getting under way at the time of field investigation so the degree of its effectiveness could not be learned. Its plan of operations are interesting. It has made an inventory of over 100 organized groups within the County and has sent letters to the ranking officer in each, mentioning that a panel of specialists was available to discuss several topics upon request. Four or 5 replies requesting use of this service had been received within 4 days after these letters were distributed. The Consumer Interest Committee includes in its membership representatives from labor unions, Parent-Teacher Associations, the County Extension Service, and the Farm Security Administration Home Management Supervisor. It intends that consumer interest chairmen will be appointed in 25 localities in the county to stimulate the various programs launched by the county committee.

The Publicity Committee of the County Defense Council will devote considerable time to consumer education in the future. In the past it has conducted a series of radio programs publicizing chiefly the protective-service activities of the Defense Council.

### Scrap Collection

Early in 1942, the War Board publicized the necessity of collecting scrap from farms. In the recent organization of county salvage committees, a War Board member was appointed to the one in this county. The Kern County Salvage Committee is to integrate scrap-collection activities into an over-all county program. The County Defense Council hired a man to serve as chairman of the Salvage Committee, and he appointed 17 volunteer community chairmen to organize a salvage warden program in the cities and unincorporated towns. In urban areas salvage depots have been designated and the salvage wardens are canvassing their areas to publicize them and encourage their use. Plans have not been completed for salvage activities in rural areas. The county chairman believes that some kind of a pick-up service will have to be inaugurated although proposals for a WPA collection program were turned down in the county.

It is expected that the cost of administering the salvage program can be met by the returns from scrap sales. The salary of the county chairman constitutes the chief expense. Several communities have indicated their willingness to donate proceeds from scrap sales to defray county expenses. The



Defense Council Coordinator believes this can be made a self-sufficient program and cites the fact that in a limited program in the spring of 1942 the USO cleared \$89.

Scrap collection in the Wasco community is under the direction of a salvage committee, with the local junk dealer as its chairman. He had collected scrap from farms as well as the town itself and ~~thinks~~ he has reached most operators but not obtained nearly all the available material. He has had special "junk jamborees" --programs which carry an admission fee of some scrap metal, with prizes for those who bring the most.

Less than a third of the returned questionnaires display awareness of the official governmental actions taken to collect scrap (table 5). Twenty-nine percent mentioned the salvage depots or Government trucks, as against 50 percent who knew that the service stations collected scrap materials. The remainder referred either to the junkyards or to implement houses, and 4 percent and no knowledge of agencies that handle scrap materials.

#### ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS IN RURAL MOBILIZATION

Data from Kern County point up certain problems in mobilizing rural people for war activities, and although comparative analysis will yield fuller information, certain conclusions available from evidence within the county can be drawn. In summary, the following organizational efforts were observed: Efforts to mobilize and utilize farm labor and to develop cooperative uses of farm machinery, to organize an air-raid warning system, an organization of rural fire fighters, to collect waste materials, and to conduct educational activities designed to acquaint the people with procedures for obtaining ~~priorities~~ and for complaining against price violations.

Table 5.- Methods of scrap disposal reported

Disposition	Number	Percent
Salvage depots or Govt. trucks	23	28
Service stations or oil company trucks	40	50
Junk yards	11	14
Implement houses	2	3
Boy Scouts	1	1
No knowledge	3	4
Total	80	100

Each of the activities, insofar as they have been developed at all were handled separately with little or no relationship to any of the others. Furthermore, each was sponsored mainly by that agency which normally performed



related functions, or by one which had been specifically created to handle it. Thus the labor-supply problem was ultimately tackled by the War Board and the fire-fighting groups were set up by the County Fire Department. The Civilian Defense Council established special committees to develop the air-raid warning system and to collect salvage, both of which have used normal channels in their activities - the Sheriff's office and the junk men, respectively.

Geographical segmentation and hierarchical ranking of volunteers into a "block system" is not extensive. The air-raid warning service is the only one so established. Each fire crew has a specified area of responsibility but is responsible to the paid county fire official residing in its own community but has no other characteristics of the "block system". An attempt was made to establish a block system to handle the labor problem, but it did not function. The Farm Advisor believes that a complete block-system structure--anything on the order of a neighborhood-leader plan--would be impracticable for Kern County and has never tried to establish one. He thinks the nature of land tenure and the pattern of settlement are against its success for large areas are uninhabited and farmed by absentee operators.

Although normal channels of authority have been extensively utilized to administer wartime undertakings, clubs and other private organizations have taken little part and then only in subsidiary and never in controlling roles. In this capacity they have been very helpful in manning posts and assisting in the organization of defense activities within localities. Similarly, business corporations have helped to set up parts of the civilian defense programs which could be conducted within their organizational structure. Though accusations of using the defense organization for political or other private ends have been made, no evidence to support these claims was found.

Table 3 shows the data on coverage of war activities. Rarely do as many as half of the sample show themselves to be aware of any single program. Regional differences proved to be the only significant variations in awareness of the air-raid warning system. While the program reached farmers and nonfarmers, American and foreign born, and men and women alike, some communities were not reached and others responded well. Two communities scored very high, a third (Arvin) had a poor showing, and a fourth (Delano) failed completely to have any system of air-raid warning. Delano scored as well or better than other communities in awareness of other programs, but the Arvin community showed a consistently low proportion of responses. The absence of an air-raid warden system in Delano therefore does not reflect lack of popular interest, but rather official negligence, whereas the Arvin situation suggests a general disinterested attitude. Such an attitude was further suggested in interviews with personnel responsible for the program.

The existence of the voluntary fire companies and the fire wardens was known to only a small proportion--almost exclusively to the farm operators for both women and nonfarmers showed poor responses. This limited awareness is to be expected for the Extension staff, whose activities have long been confined to working with farmers, was instrumental in organizing these companies. Except for the low level of awareness in Arvin, responses displaying a knowledge of the fire companies were fairly uniform among the communities.



Despite the fact that the Farm Advisor does not consider a block system feasible in the county, those programs which have been built up on the basis of such a system have proved to be better known than those which were dependent upon other ways to create popular understanding. Information on methods of obtaining priority ratings and of protesting price ceilings have been presented in the newspaper and on the radio, and yet the awareness level is consistently low for all communities. Undoubtedly the fact of organization contributes to this difference. Failure to develop action on the labor problem through a block organization suggests difficulties in establishing and maintaining the block organizations but does not deny their value.

The data from Kern County suggest a series of considerations about the organizational activities which may be set up as working hypotheses until final data from this study are available:

(1) Maintenance of all organizational control in official or quasi-official hands has kept factional or jurisdictional feelings from hindering the emergency activities.

(2) Activities of the special defense organization--the Civilian Defense Council--tend to reach all classes of the population whereas a group developed by the Extension Service are likely, out of long habit, to limit their influence to farm operators.

(3) The loose organization of the air-raid warden system allows for much local initiative, and makes for exceptionally good organization in instances where the leaders display intensive interest and initiative, but they may result in complete failure (as in Delano) or poor response (as in Arvin), if good leadership is wanting.

(4) Failure to institutionalize regular sharing customs--both of farm labor and farm machinery--suggests that organizational activity has not proceeded as far or as successfully as possible. A minority of farmers appear to be ahead of governmental officials who have failed to stimulate and increase such cooperative efforts.

(5) As the awareness scores of various activities do not show any consistent pattern display nothing inherent in type-of-farming area or in occupation making for such awareness. Where evidence of greater awareness among certain groups appear, the causes seem to lie in one or both of two factors: (1) one group has more interest in the matter; (2) more effort has been made to reach the group.

(6) The scores reveal that a block organization, with its personal contacts, makes for considerably greater awareness. The relatively higher proportion of correct answers on the air-raid warden question demonstrate, as do the consistently better scores of those who were visited by their wardens (table 4). Yet it must be remembered that this is achieved at a relatively high expenditure of effort.



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
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A STUDY OF THE METHODS OF MOBILIZING RURAL PEOPLE FOR WAR EMERGENCIES,  
SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY 1/

INTRODUCTION

America's entrance into the war has created a myriad of new problems for the civilian population--problems of protection in case of emergency, problems of production with limited resources, problems of developing new awarenesses and activities. It is the purpose of this study to determine how such problems have been met in the rural areas of a California county, the methods used, and the extent to which they have been successful. Its ultimate purpose is to serve personnel responsible for developing like action in other rural areas in the future by presenting to them the insights developed in this county and the pitfalls to be avoided.

Two essential sources of information have been used. The first is comprised of interviews with persons responsible for war emergencies, including a range from the highest county official to the block warden in air raid rural areas. The second is the schedules taken from members of rural families whose actions and cooperation have been desired or required. From the former, knowledge has been obtained of the activities attempted, the methods used and some of the results achieved. From the latter, a key has been derived of the degree in which such actions have achieved results and an awareness among the lay population.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The U.S.D.A. War Board

Most activities involving rural mobilization are under State and Federal agricultural agencies or under the Civilian Defense organization, though other governmental and private agencies have a place in the picture, and some local groups have attempted vital functions. The agencies of the U. S. Department of Agriculture administer the Food for Freedom program through County U.S.D.A. War Boards comprised of ranking officials of each Department of Agriculture agency having an office in the county. The County War Boards act in advisory and coordinating capacities. They make preliminary recommendations for final WPB action on priorities for certain types of farm equipment, supplies, and power line extensions. They also sponsor activities designed to carry out the production of needed agricultural products. For some time they had the assistance of a group of Stockton business people known as the Publicists, an organization which will be discussed below.

1/ Prepared by Walter R. Goldschmidt and John S. Page. Field studies were made by Mr. Page, Miss Mary Eselun, and Mr. Goldschmidt, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Berkeley, California, October 1942.





### Civilian Defense Council

Within San Joaquin County there are four Civilian Defense Councils, one for Stockton, one for each of the two other larger towns, and a fourth, the County Defense Council, for the remainder of the county. The County Defense Council has by county ordinance a membership of 20. Its affairs are administered by an executive committee of 7. The Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, the District Attorney, the Commissioner of Public Works, the Sheriff, the Agricultural Commissioner, and the County Health Commissioner together with a publicity director (Boy Scout Administrator) comprise the executive committee. Originally there were 7 standing committees of the County Defense Council which paralleled standing committees of the State Defense Council. These committees were as follows: Industrial Resources and Production; Transportation, Housing, Works, and Facilities; Human Resources and Skills; Civil Protection; Agricultural Resources and Production; Health, Welfare, and Consumer Interest; and Public Information. Departures from this original organization have been made as activities progressed so that some of these committees are relatively inactive. The two original standing committees chiefly concerned with civilian mobilization are the Civil Protection Committee and the Agricultural Resources and Production Committee. The County Sheriff is Chairman of the former, the County Agricultural Commissioner of the latter. The Civil Protection Committee provides what are commonly called "protective services", that is, auxiliary police, auxiliary firemen, and the air raid warden organization. The Agricultural Resources and Production Committee has undergone modification which will be more fully explained later. It is at present essentially the same organization as that commonly known as the "Farm Labor Committee."

### Rural Defense Division

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, the Farm Advisor initiated a program of organization designed to reach every farmer of the county. Similar to the neighborhood leader plan of the Federal Extension Service, this organization was established on the basis of geographical divisions. The rural areas of the county were delineated into 16 community areas. These communities were based upon the Farm Bureau Federation centers, but the geographical boundaries were clearly set forth. Each community was divided into from 3 to 12 block areas and each of these into smaller units called group areas. Personnel to be responsible for each of these subdivisions were appointed and were known as Center Chairmen, Block Chairmen, and Captains. This block system was designed to function as a means of getting information to the farm population, especially in view of the curtailed use of normal facilities for communication. There is an Executive Committee to this block organization which has a planning function. For a brief time this Committee served as the County Farm Labor Subcommittee but was superseded by the present Farm Labor Committee. This block organization and its Executive Committee have been designated by the County Defense Council as its Rural Defense Division, and as such perform Defense Council functions. The entire block system will be referred to henceforth as the Rural Defense Division.





- 1 -

Utilizing this block system, several emergency activities were undertaken, the most important being the Air Raid Warden service. While this block organization is directly responsible to the Farm Advisor's office, it attempts to tie in with other agencies and organizations. Its connection with the Farm Bureau Federation, while not official, is maintained by the fact that all community chairmen are or were Farm Bureau Center Chairmen as well, and these chairmen personally selected the remainder of the organization. The Air Raid Warden activities bring the organization into the County Defense Council. The Farm Advisor considers the organization capable of performing functions requiring speedy coverage in rural areas for such agencies as the War Board.

### Farm Labor Committees

Numerous committees have attempted to handle problems of labor supply. The Executive Committee of the Rural Defense Division assumed the role of Labor Subcommittee to the relatively inactive County Agricultural Planning Committee for a short period in the spring of 1942. At about the same time both the Grange and the Farm Bureau had labor committees. The County Defense Council's Agricultural Resources and Production Committee took over the problem of labor supply as its major focus of attention. Before this was possible, however, there had to be a reorganization through which the Agricultural Commissioner gained control of labor planning for the county. A Farm Labor Coordinating Committee was established in an attempt to coordinate the activities of the above mentioned committees. In addition to representatives from them, its membership also comprised delegates from several commodity groups. Its first action was to recommend that the county appropriate \$10,000 for personnel to work on farm labor. The Board of Supervisors in lieu of granting this request designated the Agricultural Commissioner as Labor Coordinator with authority to use part of his 25-man staff on labor problems.

The Labor Coordinator immediately converted his Agricultural Resources and Production Committee (Defense Council) into the County Farm Labor Committee, after increasing its membership to include 35 persons, representing all Federal and county public agencies, all important commodity groups, and five localized organizations developed by farmers in the major agricultural areas of the county. The Farm Labor Committee's function according to the Labor Coordinator is "to keep labor within the district and keep them working. We want to get farmers to notify procurement offices when they release labor so we can find jobs for these laborers with a minimum loss of their time." The Labor Coordinator views the problem of educating farmers on the use of organized channels in working out their labor problems as an important phase of the Labor Committee's work.

The Farm Labor Committee received the assistance of the Publicists Committee after objection was raised to the way this group of private individuals was being used by the County War Board. This will be discussed below.





The local organizations collaborating with the Farm Labor Committee and through it with the U. S. Employment Service have been set up under the auspices of such groups as Chambers of Commerce or local commodity associations. There are five in the county:

The Lodi Farm Labor Procurement Association, Incorporated.

The Linden Agricultural Labor Association (not yet incorporated).

The South San Joaquin Labor Association (composed of committees organized in Manteca, Ripon, and Escalon but which work as a unit. Each town has its own labor procurement office).

The Agricultural Committee of the Tracy District Chamber of Commerce.

The Delta Growers (this group covers the area of large farms on the San Joaquin Delta. Sugar beets are one of the most important commodities grown and this group is assisted by the labor recruiting staffs of the sugar companies).

The most completely organized local organization is the one at Lodi. It was organized in February 1942 and was incorporated in May. On the same general pattern but less developed is the Linden group. Activities of the South San Joaquin County organization are much less developed. The Escalon branch includes, for instance, only 20 farmers. The Tracy committee is virtually inactive.

### The Publicists

The Publicists are a group of about 20 well-known citizens of Stockton and other cities in San Joaquin County who have high status in their communities. This group was started by a representative of the Allis Chalmers Company who felt that his company could maintain good will among farmers by working on projects which would help stimulate the Food for Victory Program. He recruited his membership from the ranks of the Stockton Toastmasters' Club. All of the men included have reputations as public speakers and evidently are effective in getting action on "movements."

The Publicists affixed themselves to the War Board and volunteered to get public support for problems and projects facing the War Board. They organized the following special committees to deal with activities of the War Board involving public relationships:

1. Publicity. Under this Committee publicity and news of War Board activities are placed before public gatherings through the press and the radio.
2. Draft Committee. This Committee is organized to take whatever action possible in educating farm operators on the mechanics of securing deferments for farm workers.





3. Transportation Committee. Attempts to stimulate the organization of transportation pools among farmers and to explain legal implications of joint use of transportation equipment are the primary functions of the Transportation Committee. The job is to publicize cooperative use of trucks and autos among rural people rather than to serve in any technical capacity on the questions involved.
4. Machinery Committee. The Machinery Committee is set up to stimulate joint use of farm machinery among neighboring farmers.
5. Bag and Container Committee. This Committee obtains inventories of stock from bag and container suppliers and encourages them to secure additional supplies while still available.
6. The Apprentice Plan Committee. Farmers are requested to place urban boys of high school age in their homes as apprentice workers to alleviate the labor shortages.
7. Ten Percent Plan Committee. The purpose of this plan is to get industrial and business firms to donate 10 percent of the time of their personnel for use as an emergency labor supply if and when a stringent farm labor shortage occurs.
8. Adult Registration Committee. After the registration for volunteer agricultural workers by the Employment Service brought only 101 responses, the Publicists decided that they could do a much better job in arousing interest. They established a committee to enlist such volunteers.

As previously mentioned, the Publicists were affiliated with the County War Board, but upon recommendation of the State War Board that the activities of this private group should not be identified with a governmental organization, they changed their allegiance to the Farm Labor Committee.

These several organizations then, the War Board, the County Defense Council, the Rural Defense Division, the Farm Labor Committee, the Publicist group, and the labor procurement organizations of the several agricultural districts are all active in developing programs designed to provide emergency protection to rural areas and to aid agricultural production. With this background knowledge of these organizations we can discuss the programs that have been developed.

#### EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR WARTIME AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Special demands created by our wartime economy are developing specific hardships on the producers of food and fiber. These are largely the result of shortages in labor and supplies and partly the result of new needs. Of all changes, that which is creating most concern in San Joaquin County at present is the diminished supply of available agricultural labor.





## Farm Labor Problem

Agricultural production in this county is completely dependent upon a supply of seasonal workers. It has never been the general practice to keep these laborers on the farms during off seasons, nor even to house them during periods of peak labor needs. Thus, the customary labor supply has been from transient sources. Since the last war, farmers have had no difficulty in getting this type of labor, but the fear of a labor shortage began to be felt early this year. Prior to the peak labor demand period early in the summer little concerted action had been developed to increase the supply of available workers. At this time farmers throughout the State were depending upon Federal action to solve their labor problems, requesting FFA camp labor, demanding the importation of Mexicans, and even asking for conscription of labor. When producers in San Joaquin County became convinced that the Federal Government could not solve their problems, they began to look for local solutions.

Two primary methods of developing the labor supply became increasingly obvious: The enrollment of local people as reserve laborers, and inducements to bring in and stabilize regular transient farm workers.

1. Enrollment of Reserve or Volunteer Labor.- The Farm Labor Committee planned that four classes of volunteer workers would be relied upon to supplement regular professional farm laborers in serving the county's agricultural needs. These were: School children, the "weekend group," housewives and other adults with free time, and the "ten percent group." At the time of the field study, the major harvest completed was that of cherries, and the first two of these four groups had been effective.

An enrollment of school children was attempted by the U. S. Employment Service with the help of the school officials. They registered 800 boys and girls. As this was a very small proportion of the total, the Publicists, then adjunct to the USDA War Board, initiated a campaign. By patriotic appeals at high school graduations, the number of registrants was increased to 2,800. Arrangements were made with the U. S. Employment Service for the Labor Coordinator to handle placements of volunteer workers. The U. S. Employment Service first, however, was to have the opportunity of filling labor orders from their current register of professional laborers. After the first week in August all available boys from the school registration had been placed in farm work, and girls were being assembled into labor crews.

The "weekend group," which aided in the harvest of cherries, was recruited from cities outside the county, and officials in San Joaquin County had no part in getting them other than to establish the need.

The other two groups were still in the processes of recruitment at the time of field investigations. A first attempt, however, had been made to recruit townspeople as a reserve labor supply. This was sponsored by the U. S. Employment Service, and enrollment cards were distributed by the Boy Scouts.





According to the Boy Scout Administrator, 20,000 cards were distributed; according to the Agricultural Commissioner, 75,000. Regardless of the number, the returns were so pitifully small that the effort was virtually fruitless with only 62 persons in Stockton and 19 in Lodi responding! For this reason the Agricultural Commissioner, in his capacity as Labor Coordinator, planned a new survey to be administered through his office. He expected to use the Stockton Air Raid Wardens to canvass systematically that city. About 1,000 wardens attended a training meeting in early August. A registration form providing more specific data than those used by the U. S. Employment Service was prepared. On this card was space for names of persons willing to work, the days to be worked, whether they would use their own cars, and how they might be reached. Actual canvassing had not begun at the time of this study. The Labor Coordinator made the interesting observation that even though the actual number of adults signed up might be small, the personal contacts by Stockton Air Raid Wardens would focus city people's attention on the expected harvest labor shortage. Such preliminary "advertising" would prepare urbanites to be receptive to patriotic appeals for their help if prospects of actual crop losses appeared in mid-harvest season.

The "ten percent group" is regarded as a final emergency source of labor. This plan advocated that business and industrial firms release 10 percent of their personnel's man-hours for agricultural work. It was assumed that firms participating could curtail nonessential activities or spread out work among remaining employees so that operating efficiency would not be impaired. The Publicists, who originally conceived the 10 percent plan, presented it at service club meetings and more directly to the management of several Stockton business houses. Results, other than knowledge that the telephone company regarded the plan impractical, were not available during the field work. The telephone company was itself experiencing a labor shortage, and its condition is probably typical of many business enterprises.

2. Inducements to Transient workers.- The San Joaquin County farmers feel keenly that the solution to their labor problem depends upon an adequate number of experienced workers. Although they are beginning to believe that other measures may be helpful, they feel they will be inadequate at best. This viewpoint was basic to their early efforts to have Mexican workers imported. In the past few months five community-wide labor procurement groups were organized, designed to obtain and stabilize workers during the harvest season. Though each group is independent, they all work in conjunction with the County Labor Coordinator. Of the five, the Lodi association is most advanced in its program, the Linden group is nearly as well developed, and the others are only in the first stages of organization. A full description of the Lodi association, and briefer ones of two others follow:

The Farm Labor Procurement Association, Inc., of Lodi had its inception in February of 1942 and was incorporated in May. 2/ It was started "because

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2/ Detailed account of this organization was obtained by an interview with its Secretary, the Deputy Agricultural Commissioner at Lodi.





the farm operators could see the writing on the wall" regarding the labor situation. Its officials are representative growers in the Lodi district, though membership includes Stockton operators.

Objectives of the organization, as expressed in letters sent to prospective members, are:

- "1. The binding together of every farmer in San Joaquin County, especially those of the Lodi district.
- "2. To use every constructive force in attempting to secure and hold agricultural labor.
- "3. To awaken the duly constituted labor authorities and agencies to the fact that we must have help in harvesting our crops.
- "4. To have every farmer cooperate to the fullest extent with those agencies and authorities.
- "5. To secure proper housing and camping facilities and camping sites for the migratory laborer--badly neglected in the past.
- "6. To get the farmer to help himself as much as possible by holding to a uniform wage scale, and to clear labor disputes through the local organizations."

Enrollment cards sent to approximately 500 growers requesting their membership at a fee of \$1 brought in 150 members. Many growers were hesitant to join as they feared a commitment to future assessments. Many members actually gave larger sums than the minimum membership dues. Packing and shipping companies and wineries were likewise requested to join, and most of them did so. Packers' fees equaled assessments of 50 cents per car shipped last year, and winery fees were 2½ cents per ton on last year's crush. This was to return about \$3,500 from the shippers and a like sum from the wineries. It was stated that some nonagricultural industries, "even though they don't stand to benefit directly," made separate donations. The Stockton Box Company was given as an example. No attempt has been made to collect money from local merchants, though if it becomes necessary they will be canvassed.

The Board of Directors and special committees have held frequent meetings, but no full membership meeting has yet been called. The Board consists of the Deputy Agricultural Commissioner, three directors at large with alternates, and one member and an alternate from each of 14 commodity groups - i. e., asparagus; sugar beets; celery; cherries; dairy animals; table grapes; juice grapes; hay, grain, and beans; walnuts and almonds; peaches, plums, prunes, and other tree fruit; tomatoes; vegetables; melons; and meat animals.

The Deputy Agricultural Commissioner's status as Secretary and one of the Directors of the association permits close coordination with the County Labor Coordinator, who is also the County Agricultural Commissioner, and the Farm Labor Committee. Four standing committees have been established - Public Relations, Fund Raising, Exchange and Placement of Labor, and Housing.





Fruit and grape growers so far have displayed more interest in the association than the vegetable growers. The latter, especially those operating Delta lands, have in the past used single male workers for whom they have supplied adequate housing. They still expect to get them in something approaching adequate numbers.

To date, the Lodi association has established a labor information office on Highway 99, South of Lodi, and has planned camping facilities for prospective labor. This labor information office now operated by the Chamber of Commerce gives information on labor opportunities and housing to workers passing by on the main highway. The person in charge interprets his job as one of selling the community to the workers. Actual job placements are not made from this office; instead all persons are referred to the U. S. Employment Service office in Lodi. This is done in order to maintain good relationships with that office but is subject to some criticism from the farmers.

At the time of investigation, no camping facilities had been established, but negotiations were nearing completion for three camps. One of these is a previously condemned camping place which the association intends to improve to meet the sanitary specifications of the Health Department. It is capable of housing 200 to 225 families. The second will take care of 200 families. The third is a former tourist camp which will be leased from its present manager.

Aside from these two functions, the association intends "to keep ranchers in line and to stop them from stealing labor from one another." Whether it can succeed in this task is doubtful, but it probably will serve to reduce pirating and counter-bidding for labor. The small percent of membership and the competition from producers in other communities makes this objective difficult. The County Labor Coordinator believes his office can eliminate such labor pirating by coordinating similar efforts of other local labor associations.

The Agricultural Committee of the Tracy District Chamber of Commerce has tried to establish an association similar to Lodi's, but little concerted action has so far resulted. This group has as its Secretary the Deputy Agricultural Commissioner and is made up of representatives of the various commodity producers in the area. Most of the persons appointed are the larger growers. One of the members, a large Delta ranch operator, is a member of the County Farm Labor Committee but has not attended a meeting. According to one official, "The farmers here [in the Tracy district] are not interested in making the necessary sacrifices to cooperate in the matter of organizing their activities with regard to labor needs... [They] consider it Uncle Sam's business to see to it that they get the necessary labor." He quoted one farmer as saying, "If the Government wants the crops, it has to see to it that they can be harvested." Another official said, "These farmers are the hardest people to help I've ever dealt with. You can't help people who don't want to be helped. I tried to organize the community to go out and help in the pea picking. These farmers just wanted a certain type of labor, and they deprecated the idea of having townspeople do the work. They said it was too hard. Now they say the tomatoes are too difficult for persons who are not toughened to the work."





In the Escalon district cooperation among growers is greater, according to the President of the labor procurement association. This association was not very well organized at the time of investigation, however. It was started by a group of 20 peach growers and is being financed by assessments of \$1 per grower plus 10 cents per acre of peaches. "It is the idea of this group," said the President, "to attempt to get labor to stay in the Escalon district. The first problem is either to buy or rent a camp with the proper sanitary accommodations. I figure we need a decent camp, for a fellow camping on the highway, if he is a good man to start with, won't stay good very long." The President seems to feel that most of the labor needed in Escalon could be given year around employment, though growers have always used transient workers.

This organization has established a labor clearing house staffed by the librarian in the county building. This office had been in existence only a few days, yet made 11 placements in one day. When asked about publicity, the President said, "It's been noised around," and indicated that the local newspaper had carried articles.

A third activity has been an effort to stabilize wage rates. Growers agreed to pay 50 cents per hour as a starting wage for peach picking. They expected to go up to 60 cents but did not want to start at that sum as they would then, they felt, be made to raise to 70 cents. The Escalon community is smaller and the growers are, on the whole, operating smaller acreages than in either the Lodi or Tracy districts. The organization was largely inspired by the County Labor Coordinator and is established on a commodity basis.

In a questionnaire taken from rural persons in five communities in the county, one question requested information on methods of labor procurement used or known to be available. The results of this questionnaire demonstrate a consistently low level of awareness of the methods developed for meeting the labor shortage. In view of the emphasis that has been placed on the labor shortage as the major farm problem, the answers may be considered rather disappointing. Of the 49 farm operators interviewed, only 4 mentioned the use of the local labor procurement associations; 4 had informal arrangements with neighbors; 4 hired neighbors; 8 obtained labor through the U. S. Employment Service; 9 obtained labor through private agencies; 10 either had no plans or needed no labor; 2 operated through contractors; and 8 had a variety of arrangements.

#### Farm Machinery

Though farm operations in the area depend upon a large amount of specialized machinery, the farm implement problem is not generally considered an acute one. A farm repair program was sponsored by the Farm Advisor during the winter of 1941-42. The Farm Advisor said that the implement houses, which gave full support to this campaign, reported that sale of parts jumped to 300 percent of normal. Attempts have not yet been made by the Farm Advisor's office or other public agencies to organize cooperative use of equipment. Most operators interviewed had sufficient on hand to last them at least through





the fall season. A Community Chairman of the Rural Defense Division mentioned that one of his Captains had brought together a few farmers in the grain and hay area to share the use of trucks. A Block Captain mentioned that information had been distributed on the charges permissible for trucking other operators' commodities on a nonprofit basis to avoid the necessity of obtaining a public carrier license. He did not indicate, however, the extent to which trucks were being used cooperatively.

Statements on the schedules show that 27 operators borrow from and 29 operators lend to their neighbors, either as a matter of general practice or when necessity arises. Yet to date no such exchanges have been made into formal agreements. One farmer from Missouri recently set up a labor and machinery sharing system between himself and two of his neighbors. His efforts were successful because he owned the key equipment. A group of brothers had a similar arrangement.

### Increased Production

At the time of the field study no agency program for inducing the farmer to increase production was being carried out. Since no increases are feasible except in dairy production, any program attempted then would have been poorly timed. In the fall of 1941 the AAA had the farmers sign pledges to increase production. Though many farmers signed cards stating their willingness to increase production by stated amounts, it was apparent from a survey made in March that the farmers of San Joaquin County rarely remembered signing such a statement, often that they were misinformed as to its content, and in general were unaware of the Production Goals program.

### SALVAGE ACTIVITIES

The salvage of materials from farms is a major source of scrap metal. A preliminary survey of the availability of scrap materials was made by the Boy Scouts, who distributed cards, but the returns on this survey were so poor that it could not be utilized. A survey made by the Rural Defense Division in February 1942 covering 5,000 farms disclosed the existence of 625 tons of scrap metal on 900 farms. These data were used by the WPA. The WPA did not select the farms they canvassed on the basis of this information, for they went to every house, but they were thus forewarned as to the probable amount of scrap available and thereby could act more efficiently.

As of August 31, 204 farmers had given and 142 had sold scrap iron or rubber to the WPA. Two hundred and sixty-seven tons of iron and 4.7 tons of rubber had been obtained. Of 5,732 inquiries mailed to farmers, but 426 were returned, so that cards are no longer being sent to farmers but direct contact utilized. 3/

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3/ Information tabulated by WPA, San Francisco, and submitted by Mr. A. J. Doyle, General Superintendent, Scrap Materials Project.





Table 1.- Disposition of scrap material

Disposition	Number	Percent
To:		
Work Projects Administration	8	12
Service stations	21	31
Junk yards	13	19
No knowledge	20	30
No scrap material	3	5
Wrong agency name	2	3





The Boy Scouts had an aluminum drive in which they collected 20,000 pounds of aluminum in San Joaquin and Calaveras Counties combined. They have been collecting 40 to 50 tons of paper per month and during the rubber drive brought in 76 tons of rubber, rags, and metal from the city of Stockton. The oil companies, as per national arrangements, were chiefly responsible for the collection of rubber.

A tabulation on the disposition of scrap materials made on the basis of answers to schedules shows that the WPA activities are known to but a few persons as compared with those who know about the oil companies' work. Of the 67 persons interviewed in the county, 21 mentioned the oil companies as the place to which they delivered their scrap materials while only 8 persons mentioned the WPA. Two persons indicated the wrong agency, 3 had no scrap materials, and 20 did not know what disposition to make of their scrap. Thirteen reported they sold it to junk yards.

#### EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Every activity involving the mobilization of rural people has its educational aspect. But special plans are being made by the Farm Advisor to utilize the Rural Defense Division as an agent for the regular dissemination of more generalized information. At present, he is merely sending out information leaflets to the Captains so that they will become better informed. He believes that the Captains do not feel they are in a position to advise their neighbors. The Home Demonstration Agent plans to utilize the Rural Defense Division set-up in developing her wartime program.

Some effort has been made by the Office of Price Administration to explain to the people the regulations governing prices, and more specifically the means by which adjustments can be brought about. The Boy Scouts distributed leaflets in the areas where they are organized. Radio and newspaper publicity was abundant. Yet it is a startling fact that not one person in the whole group from whom schedules were taken had a reasonably accurate idea of these facts. //

The schedules show a higher knowledge of the methods of obtaining priority for equipment and building. Five persons knew the War Board's function in obtaining priorities while eleven others realized that they could be obtained by the company from which purchase was made, and seven were able to give information regarding the purchase of tires. But since 19 persons had already obtained priorities, the information seems to have been brought to but a few persons other than those who have had to seek it.

#### THE BOND DRIVE

The national campaign requesting the entire population to pledge 10 percent of its income to the purchase of War Bonds was conducted shortly before field investigations. The American Legion assumed charge of this drive in San Joaquin County. Some of the work was, however, delegated to the rural





mail carriers, and some was placed in the hands of the Rural Defense Division. The threefold division of responsibility, coupled with the poor timing of the campaign from the agricultural producer's standpoint, rendered this activity ineffective. All persons interviewed admitted the bond pledge drive had been a failure in the rural areas. No figures on amount of sales or pledges or on the number of operators making pledges were obtained.

The Rural Defense Division personnel objected most strenuously to their own participation in the drive. Some merely were annoyed over the fact that they went to farms which had already been reached by some other solicitor. Most felt, however, that the Rural Defense Division had been established to meet emergency situations resulting from enemy action, and that this request was extraneous to the purposes for which they had been mobilized.

### PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

The programs most enthusiastically received by rural and urban points are those bearing directly upon precautionary measures designed to prevent enemy attack or alleviate the results of attack. These programs are the Air Raid Warden System; local volunteer fire fighting companies, and the programs for feeding fire fighters and for fireproofing clothing; the State militia; airplane spotter stations; and emergency water supply organization.

#### Air Raid Wardens

The organization of the Rural Defense Division was started by the Farm Advisor immediately upon our entrance into the war. Later its personnel were appointed Air Raid Wardens. Each Warden covers a section of land in thickly populated regions or a larger area in less densely settled ones, usually having about 10 farm families within his jurisdiction. There are about 500 Wardens. Each is responsible to one of the Block Captains who in turn is responsible to one of the 16 Community Chairmen. This system is designed to disseminate information on emergency measures to the scattered rural population in a minimum length of time even without the use of the telephone. Estimates for reaching every farm in the county vary from half an hour by phone to 3 1/2 hours without the phone. In emergencies, however, Air Raid Wardens have been specifically instructed not to use the telephone. No experimental attempt has been made to test this organization.

The Community Chairmen and their Block Captains and Wardens have been requested to take training courses sponsored by the County Defense Council and the Red Cross. These include: 20 hours of first aid, 6 hours of gas warfare training, 6 hours of fire fighting, and 6 hours of general instructions. Most Community Chairmen reported that they attended all or most of these meetings, though in some areas the full schedule of courses had not yet been given. The Block Captains showed somewhat less knowledge of the meetings, while a report of 80 percent attendance among the Wardens may be considered good.





Some resentment was expressed by Wardens, Captains, and Chairmen over the fact that they have had to spend so much time in training, but have never had a practice blackout and have not been issued gas masks.

While its organizers, especially the Farm Advisor, do not emphasize the importance of the Air Raid Warden assignment, it is clear that the participants consider this to be the main job of the Rural Defense Division. Statements of resentment against assigning other nonemergency activities to the Rural Defense Division were frequently made. One Chairman said, "You can't put too much on a fellow. He signed up for emergency problems, and you can't put that the bond pledge drive on him."

The Farm Advisor made a conscientious effort to keep the Rural Defense Division undominated, if not uninfluenced, by the Farm Bureau Federation. Yet this remains one of the major criticisms which the organization has to fight. The close cooperation between the Farm Bureau and the Farm Advisor's office, the use of the Farm Bureau Community Centers, and the consistent use of Farm Bureau Center Chairmen as Community Chairmen lend credence to the point of view held by Grangers and other non-Farm Bureau members that the Rural Defense Division is dominated by the Farm Bureau Federation. This viewpoint is prevalent among many persons in the Rural Defense Division organization. One of its Community Chairmen when questioned as to whether he was a Farm Bureau Center Chairman replied, "Yes, that's the way the organization was set up."

Another conflict situation existed in the Air Raid Warning System. The Sheriff, as chief of that service, established Wardens in all the small towns, and in the suburban area outside the city of Stockton. In some cases these Warden systems extended into that area covered by the neighborhood leader system established by the Farm Advisor. As a result, the dual responsibility created antagonisms among county officials and the volunteer personnel. Such areas of duplication were not very extensive, and agreement was reached on most of them by the time the field study was made. In one small section from which schedules were taken, a conflict of this nature existed. The Rural Defense Division Captain stated that one part of his block, a small community which "puts one in mind of a country town," had organized its own system. Within this block the lines of authority apparently had broken down completely.

In the absence of any air raids or test blackouts, the answers to schedule questions showing awareness of the program provide the best available test of Air Raid Warden coverage.

Of all the questions asked of the farmers from whom schedules were taken, the one regarding a knowledge of Air Raid Wardens brought the largest number of correct responses. Forty-three of the 67 persons questioned (64 percent) knew who their Air Raid Wardens were or could indicate accurately where they lived. (For these and following figures see table 2.) Except





Table 2.- Awareness and knowledge of emergency measures

	Number schedules	Persons reporting awareness or knowledge of										Means of obtaining information		Protective measures	
		Air Raid		Fire		Volunteer		Methods of escape		Means of obtaining information		Protective measures		Protective measures	
		No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
All persons	67	100	42	64	19	28	25	8	12	19	29	0	0	0	0
Districts:															
Acampo	25	100	19	76	6	24	20	0	0	8	42	0	0	0	0
Banta	10	100	3	30	4	40	40	3	30	1	10	0	0	0	0
Escalon	13	100	12	91	9	39	36	5	33	4	31	0	0	0	0
Collegedale	12	100	5	45	2	28	16	1	9	3	27	0	0	0	0
Roberts Island	8	100	4	50	2	25	12	1	12	3	38	0	0	0	0
Types farms:															
Dairy	20	100	17	85	10	50	45	5	25	8	40	0	0	0	0
Fruit, nut & grape	17	100	13	76	8	35	32	1	7	7	41	0	0	0	0
Grain & truck	12	100	6	50	2	17	17	2	17	2	17	0	0	0	0
Nonfarm	18	100	7	39	1	6	6	0	0	2	11	0	0	0	0
Nationality:															
American	51	100	37	73	16	31	27	7	14	15	29	0	0	0	0
Foreign	16	100	6	38	3	19	19	1	6	4	25	0	0	0	0
Organizations:															
Members	22	100	15	68	10	45	36	6	23	8	36	0	0	0	0
Nonmembers & R.D.D.	45	100	28	62	9	20	20	3	7	12	24	0	0	0	0
Sex:															
Male	35	100	22	63	15	43	37	4	17	10	29	0	0	0	0
Female	32	100	21	66	4	13	13	4	13	9	28	0	0	0	0





For three persons who gave incorrect answers, the committee agrees that you did not know. While considerable help should be given in quality of answers, the size of the sample from each group not permit deducing any classification from this fact. Men and women were equally aware of their "fire" given's name. Farm Bureau members were only slightly more informed than were those who do not belong to that organization.

Two categories show decidedly less knowledge of the garden system than do their opposites: Persons of foreign extraction and rural persons not members of farm operators' households. 4/ Out of 27 persons interviewed, 27 could indicate their gardens (95 percent), whereas of the 18 that gave only 6 did so (33 percent). Of the 45 farm operators or members of operators' families, 36 knew their gardens (79 percent) as against 7 out of 27 (26 percent) among other rural persons. This would suggest certain class limitations in the coverage of the system as it has been established. This is substantiated by the fact that 14 of the 18 persons not members of farm operators' households (78 percent) claim never to have been visited for their gardens as compared with 17 out of 29 members of operators' households (59 percent). Similarly, persons of foreign extraction deny visits by the gardeners more frequently than older American stock (36 percent and 43 percent).

### Fire Fighting

According to the Farm Advisor, 129 volunteer fire companies have been established throughout the county. These cover every area except the Delta where large corporate farm organizations make volunteer companies impracticable and a few smaller areas where other special conditions prevail. They were organized by the Rural Defense Division, the Block Captains being asked to appoint a Fire Captain for each 50 farms within his area. These Fire Captains in turn were to appoint persons to assist them.

The fire companies were established to fight fires caused by incendiary bombs but are also expected to serve as emergency crews fighting grain and grass fires. Each company is expected to have some emergency equipment, such as spray rigs, back-pack pumps, or barrels and hoses, kept under conditions which insure quick mobility. The Rural Defense Division intended these companies to assist the County Fire Garden and to a certain extent be responsible to him. While a few companies have been reported as putting out fires and aiding the County Fire Garden, few have been developed to the extent that they can be relied upon. The County Garden is blamed by some, the unwillingness of farmers to cooperate by others, and the fact that the organization was established under the Rural Defense Division and not under the Fire Garden itself by still others.

Five of the 16 Community Chairmen were interviewed, and of these only one seems to have taken an active interest in the establishment of companies. Two Chairmen have appointed Fire Chiefs but feel that these Chiefs have not, by and large, made any positive moves in the direction of establishing companies. The other two have not appointed Fire Chiefs at all, but the Block Captains and Air Raid Gardens are taking over this function to a limited extent.

4/ Forty-nine of the 67 persons were farm operators or members of their families. Of the remaining 18, 7 were farm laborers, 3 unskilled workers, 1 electrician, 1 carpenter, 1 retired farmer, 1 landlord, and 1 occupation unknown.





The County Fire Warden himself does not maintain any direct connection with the system of volunteers. He has not given them instructions and does not know who are chiefs or what equipment is available. In general, he approves of the plan but has made no effort to integrate it with his own work.

With this organizational background we might well expect that the popular knowledge of the existence of fire companies, as shown by the schedules, is much less than the awareness of Air Raid Wardens. This, indeed, is the case. Only 19 persons knew their Fire Warden correctly, and only 17 persons knew of the existence of volunteer companies. (Some persons knew that there was a Volunteer Fire Warden without knowing that entire volunteer companies existed.) Neighborhood variation in awareness was not significantly great, but other factors show variation in such the same pattern as awareness of Air Raid Wardens. Only one person not a member of a farm family (6 percent) knew of the existence of a volunteer fire department or the name of his Fire Warden as compared with 16 farmers (33 percent). Only 3 of the 16 persons of foreign extraction knew their Warden or of the existence of companies (19 percent), while 16 of the 51 in the native American category (31 percent) were aware of their Fire Wardens' names. Men proved more cognizant of the fire protection service than did women, and Farm Bureau members more than nonmembers.

An educational program has been carried on to supplement the fire fighting program. One of the first tasks of the Rural Defense Division was to take a survey of several matters pertaining to farms, one of which was the availability of emergency fire fighting equipment. The Wardens themselves have been given instructions on methods of handling fires. The Home Demonstration Agent devoted the major part of meetings held in 8 centers to disseminating knowledge about fireproofing clothing and informing women as to the most efficient means of feeding fire fighting crews over a long period of time. These were programs developed by the Extension Service. The ultimate objective of the latter was to organize groups to establish emergency kitchens. The Agent hoped, through these meetings and through subsequent community meetings, to reach at least one person in each of the 129 fire fighting companies. She had not received any information as to the success of the program at the time of the interview.

#### Emergency Water Supply

The State Extension Service has instructed its Farm Advisors to make a survey of the availability of water independent of electric pumps on the assumption that upon enemy invasion the electric power lines would be destroyed. To this end an inventory of available sources of water independent of electric power was made. Ultimately, a map of such sources is to be made and information on nearby sources given to each farm operator.

So far neither has taken place. The schedules show that of the 67 farmers visited, 25 had no nonelectric source of water on their farms, and only 2 of those 25 had made any plans to get water from neighbors. One of





these was an Air Raid Garden. Most farmers appeared not to have given any thought to the problem, and those with available water have at the same time made arrangements for furnishing water to other farmers.

### State Militia

The membership of Militia companies to serve (in the event of enemy invasion) as adjuncts to the State Guard is not confined to rural residents but many rural persons have signed up for service in San Joaquin County. The Rural Defense Division served the Militia by taking an inventory of persons between the ages of 16 and 60 who owned or were skilled in the use of firearms. The Farm Advisor brought those responsible for Militia organization into contact with the farmers. The plan is to organize and train companies in each of 4 or 5 communities in the county. Through the Extension Service sponsored the enrollment of Militia, San Joaquin County companies have no administrative tie with the Farm Advisor's office.

### Airplane Spotters

One of the most active war programs among rural people is that of running the listening posts which spot airplanes. This program is not connected with any of the other activities though it was set up with the assistance of the Farm Advisor. He called 13 community leaders from different parts of the county, and these set up and obtained key personnel for 33 listening posts. The present set-up requires approximately 3,500 persons, each working about 4 hours per week. This program seems well known to the Farm people; some of them mistakenly gave the person in charge of the post in place of their Air Raid Garden on the questionnaire. No direct questions were asked on this matter, however. Many farmers seemed particularly proud of their spotting achievements, saying, "It's never been left unguarded," or "We reported 98 percent of the planes last month." One post was manned by persons paid out of a regular assessment.

## PROBLEMS IN RURAL MOBILIZATION

### Coverage and Effectiveness

County officials have all bent their effort toward solving problems resulting from the national emergency. The Farm Advisor created immediately an elaborate structure to reach all farms in the shortest possible time. The Agricultural Commissioner has attempted to meet the labor problem, the County Board of Supervisors has acted to establish protective services, such as the Raid Gardens, first aid stations, and the latter a Civilian Defense Council has been organized with well paid personnel; private agencies such as the Red Cross, and especially the Boy Scouts, have lent their assistance in every way possible.





Though such a listing could be continued over several pages, it does not conceal the fact that the emergency programs have not successfully reached all the rural population, and that generally a poor level of emergency exists among that segment of the people. The schedules taken from 67 rural persons in 5 communities in the county consistently show a low level of awareness. 5/ The Air Raid Wardens are best known to all classes of the population, for two-thirds of those interviewed were able in some way to identify their own Warden. Only about one-fourth of the people know their Fire Wardens or of the existence of volunteer fire fighting crews. The recognition of some priority mechanism is known to a third of the persons, but none knew any method for contacting executive offices. The CWA camp-collection program was known to one person in eight. Variation in awareness showed regional differences—especially regarding recognition of Air Raid Wardens. Some difference is shown by type of farming, but the clearest differential lies, as has already been pointed out, between the farmers and the non-farming rural population. A similar discrepancy marks off the foreign born persons from those native to this country.

Table 2 indicates the number of Air Raid Wardens' visits reported by interviewees. It cannot be assumed that all persons visited would remember the occurrence. But it can be assumed that if ever the visit was forgotten, the purpose of the Wardens' call has likewise been lost. Since it is the function of the Wardens to make their business known and remembered, we may take this as a very significant key to the effectiveness of the program. Though we cannot state that remembered visits equal actual visits, the proportion of remembered can be assumed as constant, and the fact that the non-farming rural residents and those of foreign extraction show much lower proportions indicates that these groups have been to a certain extent unintentionally omitted from the system.

Table 3 shows that persons who report Wardens' visits are better posted on all emergency measures than those who were not or do not remember being called on by an Air Raid Warden. This differential may in part be a reflection of variation in memory but must to a greater extent be laid to the educational effect of a successful visit by the Warden, and therefore points up the value of the system of personal contacts. It would tend to show that the plan of personal contacts is good insofar as that plan is and can be made to work.

### Analysis of the Problems

Comparative studies between different counties in the State will serve to develop the analysis of the reasons for the failures and shortcomings more fully, but certain tentative conclusions can be drawn from internal evidence in the study of San Joaquin County.

1. Jurisdictional disputes.— One of the most ruinous factors in the fulfillment of the emergency activities in San Joaquin was the rivalry between different groups in undertaking various activities. The Rural Defense

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5/ Table 2 gives figures on which the statements in this paragraph are based.





Table 3.- Persons remembering Air Mail Survey visits,  
and number of visits remembered

	Number schedules		Remembering visit		Total visits reported	Average per person replying
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Average
All persons	67	100	34	51	54	1.53
Districts:						
Acampo 1	6	100	3	50	8	2.6
Acampo 2	19	100	13	68	17	1.3
Banta	10	100	2	20	2	1.0
Escalon	13	100	9	77	19	2.1
Collegeville	11	100	2	18	2	1.0
Roberts Island	8	100	5	42	6	1.2
Farmer families:						
Farm operators	49	100	32	65	47	1.47
Nonfarmers	18	100	4	22	7	1.75
Nationality:						
American	51	100	29	57	43	1.43
Foreign	16	100	7	44	11	1.57





Table 4.- Awareness of emergency measures among persons remembering  
Air Raid Wardens' visits

		Persons reporting awareness or knowledge of												
Number schedules		Air Raid Warden		Fire Warden		Volunteer fire co.		Scrap collection methods		Means of obtaining information				
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Remembering visit	34	100	33	97	14	41	12	35	6	18	13	38		
Not remembering visit	33	100	10	30	5	15	5	15	2	6	6	18		





Table 5.- Awareness of emergency measures among persons  
who know their Air Raid Warden

	Persons reporting awareness of fire raid measures									
	Number		Fire Warden		Volunteer fire co.		Scrap collection methods		Means of obtaining priority	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Knowing Air Raid Warden	43	100	15	35	13	30	8	19	16	37
Failing to know Air Raid Warden	24	100	4	17	4	17	0	0	3	13



Division established rural Air Raid Wardens, while the County Defense Council set up a system in the suburban areas. This resulted in overlapping and has made for conflicts not yet completely solved. The dual or threefold responsibility with regard to the bond pledge drive created much resentment among the personnel of the Rural Defense Division, and the failure of that campaign can be laid largely to the breakdown of channeled responsibility. The early attempt to bring the Rural Defense Division into a key position with regard to the labor problem by naming its Executive Council as a Labor Subcommittee created some resentment among other officials.

On the basis of interviews taken from county officials, the conclusion is inescapable that there is a general lack of cooperation and a spirit of antagonism among the key personnel which renders many of their activities more ineffective than would otherwise be the case. One official states that another is attempting to utilize an organization to further purely political ends, another that the first is attempting to further his personal ambition through his defense activities. The War Board Chairman feels that the Rural Defense Division is not serving his needs, while the Farm Advisor feels that too much extraneous work is being placed upon his organization. //

Such obstacles to efficient action might have been avoided if the leaders of the programs found to be in conflict had in advance attempted to reach mutual agreement as to method of organization and procedure prior to their establishment. Thus if the Farm Bureau Federation and the Grange had launched the Rural Defense Division as a joint effort, much of the criticism and ill feeling that has hindered its progress could have been avoided.

2. Unilateral sponsorship.- One of the major factors underlying the jurisdictional strife and antagonism within the county is the fact that the major rural defense organization, the Rural Defense Division, has been sponsored by a single private group. An early mimeographed release on the set-up carries the title, "Plan of Organizing all Farmers into a Defense Committee Through the Use of the Farm Bureau Organization." In this circular it is specifically stated that "There is no thought of Farm Bureau membership in this set-up; it is a national defense and war program." Nevertheless, since the Farm Bureau Centers were used, since most if not all Community Chairmen are or were Farm Bureau Center Chairmen, and since the Farm Advisor shares an office with the Farm Bureau Secretary, the popular feeling is that it is a Farm Bureau organization. This was most volubly expressed by persons opposed to the Farm Bureau Federation but was also stated by Farm Bureau members. The difficulty of such private sponsorship is not that the sponsor is at fault, but that sponsorship by a single group, or even the popular assumption of such, creates antagonism and jealousies that naturally lead to the jurisdictional disputes already described. It may not be just, but it is natural for a Grange member to feel that he would be helping the Farm Bureau if he gave support to the organization they sponsored. //





3. Misunderstanding of function.- A third major problem in the effective functioning which centers on the Rural Defense Division is the fact that the working personnel have received an impression of its function that is considerably at variance with that which officially it is designed to accomplish. The source of this error cannot be determined, but the significant thing is that the disparity exists between the two conceptions. It is just this which made the working personnel resent the imposition of the bond drive upon them, and which makes it possible for one of them to say, "We have our organization set up now, they shouldn't put any more work on us than is necessary." The Rural Defense Division has attempted to function as an Air Raid Warden system, as a Fire Warden system, as a means of disseminating information, and as a group to extract bond purchase pledges. This is a wide variety of activities even though other requests for the use of the Rural Defense Division have been denied. Yet its personnel think of it only as a network for precautionary activity in case of air raids or other enemy action. Since the Rural Defense Division is to function as a general agent for the dissemination of information and for achieving cooperation in all war emergency activities, the mental set that has been established in its working personnel creates a very real barrier. Either type of function would be better than the inconsistency that now exists.

4. Inefficiency in the use of volunteer help.- There has been a tendency on the part of the persons in charge of defense activities to overwork certain groups and perhaps to overlook others who are willing to help. The additional burdens added to the working personnel of the Rural Defense Division are a case in point, though there is a general feeling that this group and those manning the airplane spotters represent the bulk of those willing to help. On the other hand, no central file of volunteer workers is maintained from which defense organizations could draw. The use of the Boy Scouts in matters that could more effectively have been done in other ways is another example. House-to-house distribution of cards, as in the employment survey, the scrap survey, and in the distribution of price control leaflets, can be handled more effectively through the mails.

5. Integration of defense activities with established administrative units.- It is of greatest importance that defense organizations and activities are brought into proper relationship with existing governmental and administrative functions. The failure to relate adequately new activities to pre-existing ones and to convince officials of the value of emergency organizations can hamper their effective use. The fire fighting units in San Joaquin County were not organized in direct cooperation with the established county Fire Warden and have, therefore, never been brought into close working relationship with him. After the organization has been established it is too late to define working relations as the interval between the organization and the functioning is detrimental to the maintenance of popular interest.





March 1943

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
U.S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics

A STUDY OF THE METHODS OF MOBILIZING RURAL PEOPLE FOR WAR EMERGENCIES,  
SUTTER COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1/

SUMMARY

Agricultural labor was not a critical problem in Sutter County in 1942. But demands for higher wages and a probable shortage of manpower in 1943 will find farm operators unprepared. It is not likely that their background of individualistic, competitive practices in handling their predominantly migratory labor force would support cooperative measures unless crops were in imminent danger of being lost. This was suggested by the unsuccessful history of labor-procurement committees in 1942. We may conclude that Sutter County's labor problem has received too little attention because the current situation has obscured the need for the immediate setting up of some framework for cooperative action in the future.

Among the least successful of the rural-mobilization projects has been the air-raid warning system. The wardens themselves generally believe that their duties will materialize only in the unlikely contingency of an air raid. Their untrained condition and the unintegrated status of their organization tend to disqualify them as a dependable emergency group.

That the farm people are really willing to cooperate was amply demonstrated by their support of the Aircraft Warning Service. Prestige lent this organization by its importance to the Army has been partly responsible, though some of the credit must go to the industry of the local men who managed each post.

The firefighting program, though organized on lines similar to those in other counties, operated under a handicap—the absence of a regular rural fire department in the county. It was difficult to get qualified teachers, and rural people were on the whole unimpressed with the need for formalizing their traditional firefighting habits. Apparently little effort has been made to publicize this venture.

The State Militia and Auxiliary Highway Patrol are both well-organized groups. Membership is very small, however, since they were not organized on a block system and no strong pressure was put on individuals to join. Their appeal has been mainly to persons concerned enough about the actual defense of Sutter County to undergo the lengthy training required by these organizations.

Comparison of different groups of people on their awareness of the scrap campaign reveals a variation from the usual pattern of responses. More unaffiliated persons know of the drive than do affiliated persons, and

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1/ Prepared by Mary P. B. Eselun. Field studies were made by Walter R. Goldschmidt and Miss Eselun, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Berkeley, California, October, 1942.

there is very little difference between the scores of men and women or Americans and foreign-born persons. This seems to indicate that an all-out publicity campaign can and does reach a portion of the population that is usually only secondarily touched by community projects.

The water-supply survey, establishment of first-aid stations, the war bond drive, the housing survey, and the educational programs were all undertaken, with varying results, as special-purpose projects. Some gathered information for emergency use; some were aimed at limited audiences (the nutrition program); some have not yet got under way. Comparison of Sutter County's effort in these activities with the work of other counties will probably show much the same levels of achievement.

Some conclusions may be derived from the data regarding Sutter County which should bear on the general problems of rural mobilization:

(1) Where the block plan of organization of a program has been used (air-raid wardens and fire crews), and the group of officers is not closely knit, the only advantage that accrues seems to come in the recruiting phase of the work. It is easier to get volunteers if a well-known local man personally requests his friends and neighbors to serve under him. But the weakness in such a plan, as shown in Sutter County, lies in the paralyzing effect of lack of enterprise at the top levels.

(2) The organizational structure of a program need not limit its success, provided local community interest and adequate leadership are available.

(3) Certain methods of inducing greater interest and activity on the part of working personnel might well be more generally used: issuing armbands or other insignia of authority; deputizing those men whose emergency duties will require real authority; making more effort to secure well-informed teachers and adapting lectures to the abilities, duties, and intelligence of the trainees; making wider use of well-established private organizations when they are willing to cooperate; and providing more actual practice for wardens, first-aid students, etc.

(4) Where county officials do not work well together, it might prove wiser to put private organizations in charge of some kinds of projects, as was done in the Tulare County air-raid warning system.<sup>2/</sup>

(5) Given a willing rural public, a block system of organization of county-wide projects will probably work best if a single, full-time coordinator has top authority.

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<sup>2/</sup> "A Study of the Methods of Mobilizing Rural People for War Emergencies in Tulare County, California," by Walter R. Goldschmidt, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Berkeley, California, September 1942. (Mimeographed.)



## ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The Sutter County Council of Defense and the U.S.D.A. War Board have undertaken almost all of the responsibility for emergency war projects in Sutter County. The Extension Service has organized 4 of the 13 war projects; the U. S. Employment Service, the Sutter County Red Cross, the County Welfare Department, the U. S. Army, the State Division of Forestry, and local school officials have been the principal cooperating groups. Except in the salvage campaign, private organizations have been called upon for very little aid in setting up machinery for meeting rural wartime problems.

Procedure in carrying out the program has generally been for the War Board or Defense Council to decide on a project, and then to assign its administration to one person or agency, usually to a Council or Board member.

### Agricultural Agencies

Rural mobilization projects undertaken by the U.S.D.A. War Board have centered around problems of agricultural labor and obtaining priorities for farmers. A wider range of projects was handled by the Extension Service which has been responsible for setting up and administering county-wide fire-fighting units and local State Militia companies, and has sponsored a nutrition campaign and a survey of emergency water supplies.

### Council of Defense

The Defense Council was set up by the State Office of Civilian Defense, which appointed as members one county supervisor, the District Attorney, the Sheriff, and one other county official. These men then selected 11 more persons from the county at large to serve with them. For a few months after its organization (shortly after December 7, 1941) the Council met once a week; it now meets regularly twice a month in Yuba City. Work of the Council is financed by a revolving fund, from which is maintained a control center in Yuba City and a paid secretary (who is also secretary of the County Chamber of Commerce).

The county's air-raid warning system, a block organization of wardens, was set up by the Defense Council early in 1942 under the direction of the council secretary and the Sheriff. The secretary was also put in charge of the Aircraft Warning Service, a network of observation posts designed to aid the Army's control over aircraft flights.

Standing committees maintained by the Council include the Civilian Protection and Salvage Committees and the Committee on Health, Welfare and Consumer Interest. An agricultural committee was planned, but has never functioned, for its work would have duplicated certain activities of the War Board.

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### Other Cooperating Agencies

Two surveys of emergency-housing facilities were undertaken in Sutter County. The more successful of the two was carried out by the Sutter Red Cross Chapter and was confined to investigation of large-scale housing available for urban evacuees. Results of the earlier County Welfare Department survey were found to be out of date by October. The Welfare Department and the Red Cross also worked on plans to establish six first-aid centers for the county. In all of these projects, clubwomen, often Farm Bureau Home Center members, were active participants.

U. S. Employment Service officials were called in by the War Board to assist in the setting up of agricultural labor-procurement machinery. By October not much in the way of improving the labor outlook had come from this collaboration. At the time of this survey, the U. S. Employment Service was engaged in organizing its own placement activities so as to facilitate labor-sharing policies, rather than in working with the War Board's labor coordinator.

Sutter County has no Forestry Division offices and no county fire department. This fact has hampered organization of farm firefighter units. But the Farm Advisor obtained the services of a State Forestry lecturer, who aided greatly in training the volunteers.

Locations of aircraft observation posts were selected before December 7, 1941, by the U. S. Army, but Army officers have retained only a limited part in the administration of these posts. Thus the Army functions only secondarily in Sutter County's mobilization program.

To complete the picture of agencies cooperating on war programs, it is necessary to mention the work done by rural schools, certain local service groups, and the Boy Scouts in collecting scrap metal and rubber. The Farm Bureau Federation's Rio Oso Chapter and the Live Oak Kiwanis Club deserve special mention for their activity on the labor problem and scrap drive respectively.

### EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR WARTIME AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

#### Agricultural Labor

Farm labor problems have been the responsibility of the U.S.D.A. War Board. Although several attempts were made to secure an adequate labor supply for 1942 and to assure one for 1943, labor procurement remains an important unresolved worry. As the county is almost entirely agricultural there are virtually no urban dwellers to draw on as emergency workers. Dependence on seasonal migratory laborers has been very great, especially for the rice, peach, and nut crops. Sheep raising, the other major agricultural enterprise in the county, also requires seasonal workers, but a kind so specialized that inexperienced labor could not satisfactorily replace drafted hands. Recognition of this dependence on seasonal help, rather than the actual pinch of labor shortage, has led to widespread anxiety among farmers.

Table 1.- Sources of labor

	Primary source 1/		Secondary source 2/	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Regular measures				
Transients	25	41.0	3	6.7
Local workers	8	13.1	4	8.9
Crews furnished by others	7	11.5	0	.0
Neighbors	6	9.8	2	4.4
Agencies				
U.S. Employment Service	5	8.2	13	28.9
Private agency	1	1.6	2	4.4
F.S.A. camps	3	4.9	5	11.1
No source indicated				
No source known	0	.0	16	35.6
Needs no labor	6	9.8	--	--
Total responses 3/	61	100.0	45	100.0

1/ Answers to question 10a, "How do you go about getting labor?"

2/ Answers to question 10b, "Is there any other way of getting it?"

3/ Farmers could make more than one response to either question.

With little city labor available, two avenues of approach to the problem have been left open: recruitment of special classes of outside help and more efficient use of available labor. The former approach was tried on three occasions by the War Board. An effort to bring evacuated Japanese farm hands back into the county resulted in the first failure. An attempt to secure the services of some of the Mexican Nationals being imported for agricultural work, also failed. In the summer of 1942 a Y.M.C.A. camp was established in the county through the efforts of the War Board. But crops were late, so the boys were unemployed and dissatisfied for several weeks. However, the feeling among farmers and county officials was that this somewhat costly experience would be valuable in organizing similar camps for the 1943 harvest.

It might also be mentioned that a privately organized camp was successfully run during the spring in the Tudor-Wilson peach area, employing a group of convicts from a State penitentiary. The project was engineered by a prominent farm operator in the community, and several farmer informants stated it had been so satisfactory that they were planning to try the same arrangement themselves next year.

Ensuring efficient use of available farm workers was the second avenue of approach tried by the War Board. A full-time labor coordinator, paid for by assessment of farm operators, was appointed in the spring. It was his job to get laborers, to put laborers where they were most needed, and to keep farmers from bidding against one another. Much the same procedure was to be followed as the Lodi Labor Procurement Association had been using in San Joaquin County. 2/ The manager of an estate in Butte

2/ See "A Study of the Methods of Mobilizing Rural People for War Emergencies, San Joaquin County," by Walter R. Goldschmidt and John S. Page, U.S. Department of Agriculture, (Mimeographed) Oct. 1942.



County had been selected as the coordinator, and farm operators in Yuba, Sutter, Butte, Glenn, and Colusa Counties had expressed their willingness to work with him. Plans were laid for several projects: workers were to be registered and their migrations noted, transportation was to be furnished to wherever labor was needed, attempts were to be made to stabilize work and to set minimum wages, efforts were actually begun to provide adequate housing as an incentive to workers who might otherwise leave for industrial jobs. This whole plan was dropped in June, however, when the U.S. Employment Service manager, claiming he was not permitted to aid a private agency to make job placements, declined to work with the coordinator. For this reason and because of other unresolved difficulties, the coordinator soon resigned, and no successor was appointed.

Since then, the U.S. Employment Service has tried to take over many details of this program. It has been able to promote crew-sharing and other cooperative labor ventures in a few communities. It is significant that of 80 rural families interviewed in this survey, 18 mentioned the U.S. Employment Service as a possible source of labor supply - two to three times as many mentions as this agency got from similar groups of informants in the other three counties studied (table 1). Part of this awareness is undoubtedly due, it should be observed, not to a history of satisfactory relations between farmers and the U.S. Employment Service, but to the recent establishment in Yuba County of a huge Army cantonment 20 miles from Yuba City. Farmers have become acutely conscious that serious drainage of their permanent as well as transient help, has been taking place through the U.S. Employment Service to this camp-construction area. Private initiative has made somewhat more progress in certain districts than the War Board has achieved. For example, the Rio Oso Farm Bureau Federation Center has been exceptionally active on the labor problem. Two open meetings were called to get farmers to agree on maximum wages, and to confer with a U.S. Employment Service man on methods of surveying for labor needs. In Tudor, a new sharing arrangement was reported, in which 3 to 8 farmers shared their own and their families' labor; participants said they considered this to be an easily workable scheme for small operators. A similar plan was in operation in East Nicolaus, according to a statement by the U.S. Employment Service manager.

Two attempts to recruit emergency workers through mass public meetings were not so effective as were these small local projects. During the first scare over possible labor shortage, the Sutter Chamber of Commerce called meetings in Yuba City. Some high school boys volunteered, and schools offered to furnish busses, but it was generally felt that the response was too low to assure any kind of a substitute for the 7,000 or so migrant workers who usually harvest crops in Sutter County.

One more private measure should be mentioned, as it also appeared in certain other counties studied. A few farm operators, with police sanction, tried to employ vagrants and drunks whom they bailed out of the county jail; these soon proved to be unsatisfactory workers and the practice was discontinued.



Aside from these sporadic public and private measures, then, there seems to have been no concerted efforts to do anything of an emergency nature to ensure an adequate agricultural labor supply. Actually, by the end of the 1942 season, there had not been much cause for immediate worry; very little of the crop had been lost, in spite of widespread talk of labor shortages. Thus, we may conclude that apprehension in Sutter County is still mainly on the verbal level, since it remains unsupported by planned corrective measures.

A summary of schedule data on the awareness among farm operators of the emergency labor-supply measures is given in table 2.

Table 2.- Awareness of emergency labor-supply measures

Number of farms	Area	Number naming some measure	Number who know of none	Number claiming there are none
10	:Yuba City	0	2	8
13	:Tudor	4	1	8
12	:Live Oak	1	4	7
13	:Rio Oso	7	1	5
48		12 (25%)	8 (17%)	28 (58%)

#### Agricultural Machinery Supply

Schedule data show that 25 percent of the families interviewed had applied to the War Board for farm-equipment priorities in 1942, and nearly that many more mentioned that they were intending to install or repair old hand and gas pumps, and to buy more machinery before pre-war supplies ran too low. Yet only 1 out of the 48 farm families showed any knowledge of the FSA cooperative machinery-buying plan; 1 farm operator mentioned that it was possible to rent equipment from implement houses, and 2 customarily shared their machinery with a few relatives or friends. The overwhelming majority (42 out of 48 farmers) merely borrowed or rented from neighbors whatever they needed. Individual, competitive action seems to be rooted strongly in Sutter County customs, a conclusion borne out by the farmers' slowness to share labor. However, the War Board as yet has made no effort to publicize equipment-sharing plans and seems to have undertaken no program sponsoring special care for farm machinery.

#### PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

##### Air-Raid Warning System

To ensure prompt notification of rural residents in case of air raids, a block warden system was set up in the early spring of 1942 under the direction of the Defense Council. The rural part of Sutter County was divided into 16 zones and Yuba City into 14, with the Sheriff responsible for the area outside the county seat and the Chief of Police for city zones. As it has worked out, however, the Defense Council secretary has taken over most of the administration of the warden system in rural zones.

The organization was originally set up by calling a meeting of leading persons in the county and requesting them to act as zone wardens. Each zone warden then subdivided his own zone, selected junior wardens by whatever criteria he preferred, and arranged his own communication system. Lists of the junior wardens were sent in to the Defense Council secretary by the zone wardens whenever they thought enough volunteers had been signed up, the whole process lasting several months in some cases.

This autonomy for zone wardens led to some serious defects in the organization, particularly as the Defense Council secretary would have had to neglect his Chamber of Commerce duties if he supervised the warden system adequately. No regular meetings for wardens have been called after the first one or two in each zone (for which the Sheriff's office provided a lecturer); no insignia or authority has been given the wardens; pre-arranged communication systems are largely nonexistent; there have been no rural blackouts or communications tests (though two blackouts were held in Yuba City); few zone wardens maintain regular personal contacts with their juniors; duties of and areas covered by junior wardens were found to be clearly understood only in the Rio Oso district; and the distribution of lists of dim-out rules sent out from the OCD was left to the interest and initiative of the zone wardens.

On the credit side are certain projects pushed through by individual zone wardens who were willing to undertake responsibility for them. The Live Oak leader, for example, set up an emergency-control center in town and arranged a great deal of publicity through the local newspaper editor. A Rio Oso zone warden sponsored a well-attended first-aid course taught by his wife. These, however, are exceptions to the generally disorganized state of leadership of the warden system.

Training required of all wardens included 5 hours on incendiary bombs and poison gases and a 10-hour Red Cross first-aid course, according to the secretary of the Defense Council. Only the former set of lectures had anywhere near a complete turnout; the first-aid courses were offered in only a few districts, and then only on local initiative, and attendance by wardens was desultory. To renew interest in air-raid warden work, as well as to meet the OCD requirements, most of the zone wardens were planning to organize comprehensive courses in the winter, after the harvest. The training period did not include, as it had in several other counties, any speed tests of the communication system to be used in case of air raids, and only one zone leader mentioned having thought about the matter. Before the United States entered the war, the telephone company had arranged a special general-alarm signal for emergencies, but only a few wardens were aware of this measure.

As the County Defense Council had worked it out, the air-raid wardens were supposed to have visited each home in their areas, to have handed out printed dimout regulations, to enforce dimout rules, and to publicize the scrap-metal and bond drives. From results of the schedules taken from rural people, and from the generally confused responses of the junior wardens interviewed, it must be concluded that somewhere between the Defense Council and the junior wardens these orders were, on the whole, lost or revised. It is significant that in two or three reported instances where specific orders came to a warden from his superiors, he generally failed to carry them out, pleading gasoline or tire shortage.



Lack of knowledge among farm people of their wardens and of the warden system reflects this situation. Of 80 persons answering the questionnaires, 21 (26 percent) knew either their warden's name or where he lived. This figure compares very unfavorably with the roughly 60 percent of correct answers found in other counties using the same block type of warden system. A check on the extent of canvassing of farms by wardens may also be obtained from schedule data: Not one person reported having been officially visited by his warden, and only one warden claimed to have made such visits.

From table 3 it can be seen that less than half as many women as men knew their air-raid wardens (14 percent to 36 percent), indicating that the farm women had not become much involved in this aspect of the defense program, either as participants or as interested observers. Furthermore, of 32 persons who were not farm operators, only one knew his warden's name, and only one of the 6 foreign-born informants gave the correct answer. It is also of interest that only 3 (10 percent) of the 29 persons who belonged to no farm or civilian defense organization had learned who their wardens were; whereas 18 (35 percent) of the 51 persons with some kind of affiliation knew their wardens. These figures point to lack of genuine concern over this program and to a range of contacts limited to native-born farm operators who belong to organizations - men who might be expected to discuss defense policies at meetings even if no wardens existed. As a special emergency project, then, the air-raid warning system in Sutter County does not seem to have fulfilled its aims well.

Participants in the program are well aware of this situation. All but one of the eight wardens interviewed followed his expression of confidence in the emergency value of the organization with a criticism of the lack of activity, the confusion of orders, or the inadequacy of the training offered. In explanation, the commonest excuse given by junior wardens was that the higher officers of the organization were too busy with their own work to attend to the details of the air-raid warning system. On the other hand, zone wardens and, more cautiously, county officials suggested rather that political jealousy played too large a part in civilian defense activity.

Confusion over personnel policies, which was one of the common criticisms, has been largely a circular difficulty. The announced aims of the warden system were not implemented by orders because officials thought that farmers would be too busy to carry them out; hence, few duties devolved upon the junior wardens, and they became dissatisfied and tried to join more active emergency organizations; then the Defense Council ordered them to work with only one such organization, but hesitated to impose, for example, stricter training requirements, fearing they would go over completely to projects having clearer policies, such as the Aircraft Warning Service or the Farm Advisor's firefighters. A typical junior warden's reaction was as follows: "I've never been to a meeting or had any training (as air-raid warden), and they haven't complained; so why should I give up going to militia meetings for them?"



Table 3.- Awareness and knowledge of emergency measures

Persons reporting awareness and knowledge of:														
	Number of schedules		Air-raid warden		Fire warden		Volunteer fire company		Scrap collection		Means of obtaining priority		Protest of unfair prices	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
All persons	80	100	21	26	27	34	27	34	55	69	21	26	32	40
Districts:														
Yuba City	20	100	2	10	8	40	8	40	13	65	3	15	9	45
Tudor	20	100	6	30	7	35	8	40	13	65	6	30	9	45
Live Oak	20	100	6	30	5	25	5	25	16	80	3	15	6	30
Rio Oso	20	100	7	35	7	35	6	30	13	65	9	45	8	40
Nationality:														
American	74	100	20	27	27	36	26	35	51	69	20	27	31	42
Foreign-born	6	100	1	17	0	0	1	17	4	67	1	17	1	17
Sex:														
Male	45	100	16	36	20	44	19	42	33	73	17	38	18	40
Female	35	100	5	14	7	20	8	23	22	63	4	11	14	40
Membership:														
No memberships	29	100	3	10	7	24	6	21	21	72	2	7	7	24
All memberships	51	100	18	35	20	39	21	41	34	67	19	37	25	49
Defense organizations	40	100	16	40	19	48	20	50	28	70	17	43	21	53
Occupation:														
Farmer	48	100	20	42	21	44	21	44	38	79	20	42	23	48
Nonfarmer	32	100	1	3	6	19	6	19	17	53	1	3	9	28

Numerous suggestions for improvement of the air-raid warning system were offered during interviews by personnel of the organization. One zone warden felt that civilian defense projects in Sutter County would remain muddled until they were all unified under one responsible coordinator who would spend full time keeping them in order. Another zone warden offered much the same suggestion and added that the logical place for such authority was the Sheriff's office, it being the least politically involved county agency. All along the line, general dissatisfaction was expressed with the quality of leadership shown by the Civilian Defense Council ("They're too busy with their own work." "They don't know how to lead people." "They're politicians.") Several requests were received for some badge of authority for the wardens; they felt that their status needed some reinforcement. Finally, the greatest number of suggestions centered on lack of activity. Particularly in those communities where public spirit remained high after the patriotic surge in the first few months of 1942, wardens were willing and eager to undertake more training and to aid in practice black-outs and other projects. This attitude was most often expressed in Rio Oso and only slightly less often in Tudor.

In general, the personnel of the warden system considered the organization to have but one real function - to keep order during air raids - but they were willing to undertake wider functions if real status were afforded them and if they could be sure the work was useful.

#### Aircraft Warning Service

In October and November of 1941, at Army instigation, county meetings were held to establish the framework for a system of observation posts, to be manned by civilian volunteers, which would aid in reporting unauthorized aircraft flights. Sites for 11 posts scattered throughout the county were selected and equipped with telephones, and 800 volunteers were signed up. On December 8, 1941, these posts were activated, and most have been run on a 24-hour day basis ever since. Enthusiasm for this project was high immediately after war was declared, but attendance has fallen off considerably in some areas since then, and five posts have been closed for lack of volunteers. Overall efficiency of the Sutter County posts was reported at 87 percent in September by the Defense Council secretary, who has been responsible for the organization. In October, steps were being taken by Army officers to bring this service under close military direction.

Schedule data show the Aircraft Warning Service to be the best known of all civilian defense measures undertaken in Sutter County (see table 3); 89 percent of the 80 informants were able accurately to locate the observation post nearest their homes. The program next best known, the salvage campaign, was correctly described by 69 percent, the others showing between 26 percent and 46 percent knowledge. Forty percent of the families interviewed, including nonfarmers and farm laborers, had one or more members actually serving as observers; Rio Oso, with 75 percent of the informants serving, showed a turn-out on this project two or three times greater than that of the other communities. It might be added that Rio Oso was the only community surveyed where the post was located in a place easily accessible to the rural residents, and where armbands were given workers for faithful service. These factors probably helped maintain regular attendance.

Many of those who worked with the Aircraft Warning Service also wanted to serve as wardens, fire watchers, militiamen, or highway patrolman. But the Army tried to prevent this, and up to the time of this survey the question had not been settled, despite many and confusing debates in Defense Council meetings. In some areas personnel were adhering rigidly to the Army ruling, and in others they were following conflicting orders from the heads of other civilian defense projects. These discrepant policies have led to a good deal of defection among rural people whose interest in civilian defense might otherwise have been more intense.

Distribution of membership among the various rural defense organizations may be seen from tables 4 and 5.

Table 4.- Participation in and knowledge of Aircraft Warning Service

	Schedules		Persons aware of AWS		Persons serving in AWS	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
All districts	80	100	71	89	32	40
Districts:						
Yuba City	20	100	18	90	4	20
Tudor	20	100	16	80	8	40
Live Oak	20	100	18	90	4	20
Rio Oso	20	100	19	95	16	80
Nationality:						
American	74	100	67	91		
Foreign-born	6	100	4	67		
Sex:						
Male	45	100	41	91		
Female	35	100	30	86		
Membership:						
No memberships	29	100	25	86		
All memberships	51	100	46	90		
Defense organizations	40	100	40	100		
Occupation:						
Farmer	48	100	45	94		
Nonfarmer	32	100	26	81		

Table 5.- Membership in civilian defense organizations among families interviewed

Districts	Schedules		State Militia		Auxiliary Highway Patrol		Volunteer Fire Crew	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Yuba City	20	100	2	10	0	0	4	20
Tudor	20	100	1	5	1	5	3	15
Live Oak	20	100	1	5	1	5	2	10
Rio Oso	20	100	6	30	3	15	2	10
Total	80	100	10	13	5	6	11	14



### Fire-Fighting Units

In May 1942, the farm advisor, in accord with the statewide Extension Service program, established volunteer fire-fighting units throughout the county. The first step in the organization of this project was to call in a group of 20 leading farmers. All came, as well as some others, and from this group a committee was formed which completed plans for the firefighter organization and decided on boundaries for each company. Originally, 30 units were proposed, but these were reduced to about 20 in the final organization. Three or four chief fire wardens were appointed for the county, and they, with the help of the farm advisor's office, selected a captain for each area in their respective territories. The captains then appointed their own 10-man crews. Some reported difficulty in getting volunteers, since conflicting orders regarding activity in more than one civilian defense program held back many who would otherwise have been willing to serve. A second meeting of chiefs was soon held in Yuba City, where a lecture was given them on fire-fighting practices by a member of the State Division of Forestry. It was intended that after that a man from the Division of Forestry and one from the Farm Advisor's office would meet with each fire crew separately, but only a few such meetings were held. According to four fire wardens interviewed, turnout at crew meetings since then has been so spotty that nothing beyond a minimum of essential planning has been attempted. No further training was given them officially, and for equipment they depended on local resources. A few companies went so far as to gather spray rigs and some tools on centrally located farms, but efficient methods of calling crewmen to these centers during emergencies have not been worked out.

The situation in regard to this organization seems to be somewhat hampered by the absence of any regularly constituted rural fire-fighting department in Sutter County and the dependence on fire-fighter personnel from outside for assistance. As it has been functioning, the set-up is apparently only a slight formalization of ordinary rural fire-fighting practices. Thus Sutter County's firefighter crews cannot strictly be compared with those set up in Tulare, Kern, and San Joaquin Counties, even though it uses the same type of block system organization.

Some measure of the success of the fire crews as an emergency defense measure might be derived from the fact that 34 percent (27) of the schedules taken showed awareness of the existence of these crews (table 6). Further questioning revealed that most of these 27 persons learned about the volunteers only after a crew had helped put out a local barn or grass fire. Differences here, as in the case of knowledge of air-raid wardens, were found to exist between males and females, farmers and nonfarmers, native- and foreign-born persons, and members and non-members of organizations. Although the differences were not marked, males, farmers, Americans, and affiliated persons were all found to be more aware of emergency fire precautions than were their respective opposites.

## State Militia

The farm advisor reported considerable interest in the State Militia companies now scattered throughout the county. Immediately after the fire-fighting set-up was developed, these 20- to 40-man companies were organized through his office.

Table 6.- Awareness of emergency fire-fighting measures 1/

District	Schedules		Correct emergency measures		Nearest fire department		Incorrect response		Knows no emergency measure	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Yuba City	20	100	6	30	8	40	3	15	3	15
Tudor	20	100	5	25	4	20	2	10	9	45
Live Oak	20	100	4	20	11	55	3	15	2	10
Rio Oso	20	100	7	35	0	0	5	25	8	40
Total	80	100	27	34	23	29	13	16	22	28

1/ Answer to question 3a, "Whom do you notify in case of fire?"

In some localities, enthusiasm for them is still high enough to support weekly meetings, for example, Rio Oso and the district just west of Yuba City. Thirteen percent of the 80 families interviewed had a member in one of the State Militia groups, only 1 percent less than those with volunteer firemen in the family (table 5). Meetings consisted of military drills and consideration of problems that would arise if Sutter County were invaded. At the time of this survey, the program was officially in abeyance, though meetings still continued on local initiative. It was planned to disband the group and then start afresh after a new sign-up, according to the farm advisor. This was partly because of pressing harvest duties, partly because the political situation was uncertain (many volunteers felt that they did not wish to sign until after the gubernatorial election), and partly because some changes had to be worked out in the administration of the organization, putting it under closer Army supervision. The farm advisor expects that about five companies, located wherever the demand is great enough, will result from the proposed reorganization.

## Auxiliary Highway Patrol

The only civilian defense group with requirements for extensive training which have actually been met by all members appears to be the Auxiliary Highway Patrol. As with the Aircraft Warning Service and the State Militia, impetus for the organization of this group came from outside the county. Administrative responsibility within the county was taken over by the Defense Council, the Sheriff's office, and a representative of the State Highway Patrol. One or two organizational meetings were held and 20 hours of instruction were given, covering first-aid, fire-fighting, and highway-traffic control. Only men who completed this training and passed a physical examination were accepted by the organization. Accepted members were given armbands and identification cards, but the Army ruled that deputizing these volunteers was unnecessary. Duties of Auxiliary Highway Patrolmen are not specifically related to activity during air raids, but



rather involve traffic control in case of troop movements or evacuation of San Francisco Bay cities. This function is particularly important in Sutter County because of the large Army establishments nearby and their dependence on the county's two easily overcrowded arterial highways.

Six percent of the schedules taken were from families with a member in the Auxiliary Highway Patrol, but statements by zone wardens that 5 to 10 Highway Patrolmen live in each zone are probably a better indication of the scope of the organization. Interviewed members of the Patrol expressed satisfaction with this type of defense project; they considered it useful and necessary but some complained of conflicting information from differing agencies.

### Water-Supply Survey

Sutter County's water supply problems have related to superabundance rather than scarcity, as the county lies at the fork of the Sacramento and Feather Rivers, and as the water table throughout the county is rather high.

Possibility of emergency-supply problems, however, prompted the assistant farm advisor to conduct a questionnaire survey of available water sources. He mailed out detailed schedules of questions to farm operators and handed sheaves of them to zone wardens and fire wardens for further distribution. After some two months of work, enough data were collected to make up a complete water-supply map of Sutter County. On it were indicated all nonelectric pumping systems and enough hand-pumped wells and storage tanks to supply each area with water for both drinking and fire-fighting. Information from this map is easily available by telephone to all chiefs of fire-fighter crews.

Great satisfaction was expressed by the farm advisor with this water survey. Results of our schedules taken from farm families, however, suggest that coverage was not so complete as the farm advisor's office thought: Only 26 out of 80 rural informants recalled being contacted on the matter of emergency water supply (table 3). Furthermore, 35 percent (28) of the informants said they had made no provision even for emergency drinking water, indicating that apprehension about contaminated water was not high despite efforts of the Extension Service (table 7).

Table 7.- Preparations for emergency water supply

District	: Number of: No emergency:		: Nonelectric sources available for:		
	: schedules:	supply	: Irrigation:	Household use:	Drinking only
Yuba City	: 20	9	2	6	3
Tudor	: 20	8	1	9	2
Live Oak	: 20	3	2	15	0
Rio Oso	: 20	8	0	12	0
Total	: 80	28	5	42	5
	: Pct.	Pct.		Pct.	
	: 100	35		65	



At the time this study was made, the farm advisor had just sent out a follow-up to his water questionnaire in the form of an Extension Service bulletin on first-aid water protection on the farm during emergencies. It is probable that awareness of the emergency water-supply program would be higher had the study been made a month or so later. Water decontamination also figured as one of the monthly study projects of the Home Demonstration Agent.

### First-Aid Stations

The Red Cross and the County Welfare Department have cooperated in establishing six first-aid stations throughout the county. These are to function in case of any disaster, but were specifically intended to handle air-raid or evacuation casualties. Each station has three persons assigned to it - one a representative from the County Welfare Department, one from the Red Cross, and one volunteer with first-aid training. They have authority in that order. Locations for these units have been selected but they have not been publicized and equipment has arrived at only a few. After some disagreement with the Civilian Defense Council over who should carry the expense of this project, it was finally decided that the Red Cross should buy 15 first-aid kits (containing some bandages and stretchers) and the Defense Council should furnish most of the emergency medical supplies. The stations have actually proceeded little beyond the paper stage but personnel of the Welfare Department believe this is an exceptionally good arrangement and are especially pleased with the high degree of cooperation they are receiving from the Red Cross.

### ADDITIONAL WAR MEASURES

#### Scrap Campaign

In October 1942 the farm advisor, acting for the War Board, launched an extended campaign for scrap metal throughout the county. Nine community centers were designated as stockpile locations and a local man was put in charge of each. Most of these centers had already been serving for rubber and metal collection, but the farm advisor's action started the first real publicity campaign aimed at the great quantity of old metal on farms. Rubber had been collected earlier during a drive conducted by service stations, oil companies, and garages.

In three of the centers close and active cooperation had been volunteered by the Lion's Club (of Meridian), the Kiwanis Club (of Live Oak), and the Robbins Farm Center. These organizations provided local publicity through newspapers and direct mail and arranged for private trucks to pick up bulky scrap. Principals of rural schools cooperated by establishing subcenters for scrap collection on each school ground and urging children to bring in whatever scrap they could gather from local farms. Some principals even secured the use of private trucks for more intensive collecting drives.

The farm advisor's campaign had no definite time limit because farmers were asked to sort their scrap carefully, and to retain any parts that might be useful in averting a possible machinery shortage in 1943. It was announced that proceeds from the sale of metal so collected will go to charity.

The level of awareness of this program, as shown in table 8, was very high. This, of course, might be expected since publicity for the scrap drive had been started just 2 weeks before this study was undertaken. But the fact that the response to this drive was so high does suggest that public unawareness of the air-raid warden and certain other programs is due to the quality of leadership rather than to apathy among rural people; apparently not enough effort was made to publicize these other programs.

Table 8.- Disposition of scrap materials.

	Number of schedules		Gov't. truck or salvage dump		Junkyard, oil company or service sta.		Private or individuals		Know no disposal method	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Persons visited by collectors <sup>1/</sup>	25	100	22	88	1	4	2	8	0	0
Persons not visited	55	100	33	60	13	24	2	4	7	13
Total	80	100	55	69	14	18	4	5	7	9

<sup>1/</sup> Distribution of reported scrap collections was as follows: Yuba City, 10 (school trucks); Tudor, 2; Live Oak, 11 (Kiwanis trucks); Rio Oso, 2.

Table 8 shows that 69 percent of all schedules taken indicated knowledge of the official salvage dumps or of collections made by trucks engaged in the official drive. Only 9 percent of the informants had no idea of what to do with their scrap. Thus, the awareness of scrap-collection efforts apparent in Sutter County is more than twice as great as that found in the other counties studied. In making comparisons, however, it is important to keep in mind the recency of the Sutter campaign.

#### War Bond Drive

The Defense Council appointed a well-known man of Yuba City to head the fall and winter bond drive in Sutter County, but by the end of October his program had made little headway. At that time publicity for bond sales was confined to posters in Yuba City and to such rural community newspapers as chose to push it on their own initiative. The editor of Live Oak's paper, for example, personally undertook to head a local drive, but the program lapsed after he was drafted. Bond sales outside of Yuba City generally remained small. According to most of the farm operators interviewed, a war bond drive had very little chance of success in rural areas until after the crop harvest, for no one wanted to pledge part of an income that might not materialize. This was the reason given by several junior air-raid wardens for their failure to canvass farm homes for bond pledges.



## Housing for Evacuees

Two surveys of housing available for persons who might be evacuated from coast cities were made in Sutter County. The first of these, aimed at locating housing for evacuated children, was carried out in the early part of the year under the direction of the child welfare assistant of the County Defense Council. It supposedly consisted of a house-to-house canvass of every home in the county by women volunteers. Most of these were clubwomen, many of them active in Farm Bureau Home Center work. Results of this survey were found unsatisfactory and were later discarded; this was largely because only the highest standards of housing were considered acceptable, (that is a separate room for each child, modern plumbing, adequate food, and clean play yards). Interviews with women who had participated further revealed that almost no individual homes were visited; most of the volunteers merely asked at Home Center and other meetings if any of the women present had available space. Wherever the high standards were met, a certificate was given the home owner. According to the child welfare assistant, the 33 rooms found certifiable by this survey represented only a minute fraction of the number of people who would be willing to offer in an emergency. Yuba City itself was canvassed shortly after this by a group of 12 clubwomen to augment the results of the rural survey, and many more available rooms were located.

By summer results of this survey were out of date, for a flood in the southern part of the county had driven hundreds of families to other districts and as the whole housing picture had changed with the tremendous influx of defense and war workers. Therefore, a second survey was undertaken, this time directed and carried out by Red Cross workers. They concentrated on locating enough large public and private buildings to provide emergency housing for thousands of men, women, and children evacuees. Factors in the selection of such buildings were location, number of beds available, adequacy of kitchens, and willingness of owners to sign agreements with the Red Cross to provide disaster housing.

One A survey of food stocks on hand in stores in the county was recently made by the Red Cross, but the chairman of the Sutter chapter believed that the results were no longer valid. She was much less satisfied with this than with the housing survey. "We feel that we are now more or less prepared to meet any likely emergency, however," she stated.

## EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

### Nutrition

A program of organizing the rural homes for war was carried out during the whole of 1942 by the Extension Service Home Demonstration Agent, assisted by a member of the County Welfare Department. The Home Demonstration Agent operates through home units in ten local communities in the county; about 185 women usually attend these meetings each month. She also attends and often addresses meetings of Farm Center women, enabling her to contact about 500 other women regularly during the year. Programs pushed in this educational campaign have included studies of low-cost adequate nutrition, victory gardening, black-out methods and home safety in war, the feeding of farm fire-fighters, training of canteen workers, fire-proofing clothing, purification of water, food-preservation methods, and current developments in OPA regulations.



These projects were requested by the women themselves and were actually run by two volunteers from each unit under the direction of the Home Demonstration Agent. Another war project undertaken by the Agent was a one-day County Nutrition Institute held in Yuba City recently. She estimated that over 250 families, two-thirds of them rural, were reached by this war nutrition conference.

Although but one mention of this program was made by a woman informant on the schedules that were taken, it seems probable that its possibilities have been rather thoroughly realized under the direction of this agent.

### Priorities

Little effort has been made to publicize information regarding priorities and price ceilings. The War Board has merely released to newspapers and the radio the material it has received; by October it had not yet initiated any intensive program, but plans were on foot to establish a daily or thrice-weekly radio program to bring such information to the rural public.

Schedule results show that despite this situation, residents of Sutter County are better informed on methods of obtaining priorities than two of the other counties studied. Twenty-six percent of the informants knew the correct way of obtaining priorities on farm machinery and 46 percent could describe the procedure for getting tires. They were exceptionally well informed on where to address reports of price-ceiling violations, 40 percent naming either the OPA or a local office which could transfer the complaint for them.

Growing irritation with the reported arbitrary policy of draft boards of the county in the face of farm-labor shortages, plus wholesale applications for extra gasoline, tires, and especially pumps and machinery parts, may have been responsible for the high degree of awareness of the civilian war machinery in this county. Another possible explanation might lie in the fact that in October people all over the country were getting apprehensive about the OPA's impending rationing programs.

### SOME PROBLEMS IN RURAL MOBILIZATION

Sutter County's war activities have followed in outline the same general pattern as was found in San Joaquin, Kern, and Tulare Counties. Programs were undertaken for the purpose of mobilizing farm labor, developing an air-raid warning system, providing rural fire-fighting crews, maintaining aircraft observation posts, collecting scrap metal, providing for housing and medical care during disasters, and educating the farming public with regard to priorities, war prices, and nutrition in wartime.

Results of this survey indicate, however, that except for its wholesale support of the Aircraft Warning Service, this county has not made an outstanding success of its programs. In general, it was found that county-wide planning was not well integrated, that individual activities, with few

exceptions, were conducted with little determination, and that awareness of defense preparations was not adequate to ensure effective action in the event of emergencies. It is true that scores for overall awareness for Sutter County are about the same as those for other counties studied. But for comparative purposes scores in Sutter County must be considered lower.

Before any thoroughgoing comparisons are attempted between the four counties certain problems characteristic of the Sutter mobilization effort should be mentioned. They seem to depend on two major factors: the organizational structure of the program and local differences within the county.

### Organizational Problems

Though the War Board and the Defense Council have been responsible for the whole rural-mobilization effort, no serious effort seems to have been made to coordinate the separate activities into a well-rounded program for emergency action. In the event of a major disaster, it is unlikely that these agencies would be able to marshal their forces quickly or to meet completely all the problems that would arise. This we infer from the unorganized state of the emergency communication system and from the widespread lack of knowledge on the part of many volunteers of the work done by groups other than their own. Plans have apparently not been worked out for dovetailing the work of the different defense groups, and adequate ambulance corps and first-aid squads have not been developed.

It has been observed in other counties that separate handling of the projects in a civilian defense program need not result in inefficiency. As it happened in Sutter County, however, the working personnel tended to overlap to a great extent; not enough farm people were willing to serve to provide each project with a full quota of volunteers. Thus there were several offices, issuing different orders and pushing their work with different degrees of effort, acting simultaneously on the same personnel. Added to the lack of smooth coordination at the Defense Board level, this situation helped to foster confusion in a direct as well as indirect fashion.

Another problem that might be considered in the organizational category is the question of whether to use pre-existing group affiliations in setting up a defense project. Sutter County has generally bypassed private groups in organizing its activities; greater use of the leadership and lines of authority of such groups might have speeded up the program.

### Problems Arising From Inter-Community Differences

In Sutter, as in the other counties studied, the quality of leadership and the intensity of community spirit appear to be factors crossing that of organizational structure. Where an organization is insufficiently integrated, individual leaders or very active communities may still produce good results. Two types of effects are observable: a single project may develop successfully in an otherwise apathetic district, or a community may show generally high awareness of an activity in many fields of interest.



Analysis of one district will serve as an example: In Rio Oso, one of the zone wardenships is filled by a six-county chairman of the Farm Bureau Federation, a man who has long been a leader in local as well as county affairs. For his junior wardens he selected men who also function as leaders in Rio Oso. Probably as a result, Rio Oso gave top awareness scores on the two programs which this man engineered - the air-raid warning system and emergency labor procurement planning (tables 2 and 3). Rio Oso also has the highest relative membership score, as revealed by schedule data, for the Highway Patrol and State Militia; both of these activities were led by the scoutmaster, a determined local man who is a thorough believer in the need for trained defense volunteers. Effects of a high level of interest may also be seen in the schedule data. Sixteen of the Rio Oso informants (80 percent) were serving on the observation post in their district and expressed approval of their job; this is twice the number serving in Tudor and four times the record of the other two communities (table 4). Rio Oso also showed the highest degree of awareness of this program, though inter-community differences here are probably negligible. Interviews with personnel handling the fire-fighting units, the scrap collection, and the housing survey in this area, however, gave evidence that neither active leadership nor special community interest was present. Table 3 shows that Rio Oso did not distinguish itself in these programs.

Similar analyses of data from the other three communities tend to support the same hypothesis. Live Oak, for instance, gave outstanding awareness scores (80 percent) on the scrap-drive question, probably reflecting the all-out campaign being run by the Kiwanis Club at the time of this survey. The four communities are all very much alike - small farms, specializing in fruits, nuts, and some rice, and all but one lying 10 to 20 miles out of the nearest real business center - and generalizations from the fairly clear-cut Rio Oso case are likely to be valid.



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A STUDY OF THE METHODS OF MOBILIZING RURAL PEOPLE FOR WAR EMERGENCIES,  
TULARE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1/

SUMMARY

War's problems reach into every phase and area of our existence, and they require organized activity. This study attempts to evaluate the efforts to bring together the rural people of Tulare County, California, for meeting warborne problems. The primary responsibility for organizing activities rests with the War Boards and the County Defense and Disaster Council. The former has had the responsibility of dealing with agricultural production problems; the latter with problems of civilian defense.

The major War Board problem has been the curtailed labor supply. A shortage of workers was anticipated at the beginning of the 1941 season, and a subcommittee to the Agricultural Planning Committee was established to deal with this problem. This committee has undergone several modifications in title and sponsorship, yet its functions and composition have largely remained constant. It is at present called the Agricultural Manpower Commission and serves in part the War Manpower Commission.

This group set up a series of community committees in 11 of the 14 AAA districts. They were made up of farmers and townspeople, including wherever possible a representative of the local chamber of commerce or other civic body. These committees were to determine labor needs and bring them to the attention of county officials; they were to publicize the labor problem and prepare for the mobilization of town people to help in the harvest; they were to assist in coordinating the use of labor and developing cooperative use of labor crews; and they were to educate the farmers in the efficient use of labor. These local representatives are also members of the County Agricultural Manpower Commission. Their most ambitious and direct program was to establish labor clearing houses which were to serve as labor placement agencies, and the person in charge was frequently made field representative to the U. S. Employment Service. The program has not been successful; neither farmer nor laborer has used this means of getting workers or jobs.

At the request of the Farm Bureau and the Associated Farmers, a county labor coordinator was appointed. His function has been that of a labor scout. A person with rather intimate acquaintance with the laboring population within and outside Tulare County he attempts to bring workers to the areas where shortages exist. He does not make placements.

Despite these efforts, the average farmer is unaware of efforts to solve his farm labor problem. But 9 of the 42 farm operators interviewed were aware of any emergency activity, 4 mentioned the chamber of commerce

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1/ Prepared by Walter R. Goldschmidt, Assistant Social Science Analyst.  
Issued from the office in Berkeley, California.

clearing houses, 3 the activities of their commodity association, and 2 those of the farm organizations. Though 9 know of such activities, they were not counting on them to solve the labor problem. Only two of them expected to get their workers by means of these emergency measures, while almost all were depending upon regular sources of transient and local labor.

Perhaps the clearest benefit derived from the labor committee was the establishment of fuller understanding between the farm leaders in the county and the U. S. Employment Service. This process is being augmented by the present affiliation of the committee, wherein the Employment Service has a key position. Even so, only one farmer interviewed recognized the U. S. Employment Service as a primary source of workers and 5 others as a secondary one.

Farm machinery problems have not yet proved acute in this area. The War Boards have publicized the need for maintenance and repair, but no efforts have been made to organize the use of privately-owned equipment. Two operators reported sharing arrangements, 5 reported rental from neighbors, and 27 had informal borrowing arrangements. Such a pattern of mutual dependence should make it relatively easy to formalize the channels for equipment sharing when the problem becomes acute.

Precautionary measures have been centralized under the Tulare County Defense and Disaster Council, whose activities are directed by a paid coordinator. The Council is divided into two services, "protective," and "war," and each subdivided into a series of functions. For each function there is a committee ready to serve in case of emergency. The air raid warning system has mobilized people into a block system. The ranking officer in each community is the local law-enforcing agent and he is directly responsible to county headquarters. Under him is a ranked order of captains, and senior and junior air raid wardens. These wardens have been requested to become familiar with first aid, incendiary bomb control and other such protective measures. They are supposed to have taken questionnaires from each of their constituents to establish the number of residents, their ages and special problems, and other facts about the household which may be important in time of disaster. Presumably they have called upon persons in their block at least twice. The wardens have not been asked to engage in any activities not directly connected with their protective function.

Save for the aircraft warning service, this is the program best known to the rural population. Yet less than a third of the farm population know who their air raid warden is. There is considerable differential in the degree of awareness, as was determined by the study made of a sample population. One community showed an exceptionally low score, which appears to be the result of the sparse settlement and the absolute lack of neighborhood solidarity. Here, as in San Joaquin County, there is evidence that social status affects participation, as farm laborers show less awareness than farm operators, foreign-born less than native born, and persons without membership in organizations less than those who are members. A corollary to this is the fact that these groups also reported fewer visits by their wardens, verifying a marked tendency to by-pass them. Despite the fact that this is the best known defense program of any, it fails to reach all the people because of poor organization in some areas and because of social prejudices.



An ambitious program for civilian fire fighters has been launched. Rural fire-fighting companies in 98 neighborhoods were organized by the Extension Agent and the State and County Fire Department. A total of about 1,300 men engage in this activity and 16 of the crews have been reported as assisting on local fires throughout the county. Although this organization has had real educational value, such value could be enhanced further, for only a fourth of the population knows of the existence of these companies, and in one community they were virtually unknown. Again, there is evidence of a differential according to social characteristics.

That defense activity which has most firmly taken hold of the rural population -- the only one better known than the air raid wardens -- is the aircraft-warning service. These "airplane spotters" are known to 82 percent of the population and about 30 percent of the families have one or more members serving as spotters. This record makes clear the people's interest in defense activities and their willingness to serve, and therefore points to organizational factors as the cause for poor showing in other activities.

Other programs should be mentioned briefly. Attempts to get bond pledges were generally unsuccessful, largely because the program was poorly timed and uncoordinated. Many salvage programs were achieving results, but the general population was more aware of the activities of private organizations such as the gasoline stations than they were of the community efforts in this direction. Awareness of the proper means of obtaining priorities was low (6 percent) and techniques for protesting violations of price controls was not good (24 percent).

The essential fact disclosed in this study is that, though efforts have been made to develop every phase of the civilian war effort, these have met with indifferent success. It is not easy to assign causes for this, nor are all the shortcomings to be held to a single explanation. The farm-labor problem has not reached the people for two reasons: (1) Labor difficulties have not really been so severe as was anticipated, and (2) the farmers are not in a frame of mind to alter their habitual patterns of behavior until the problems are immediately upon them. This is even more clear in the farm machinery situation.

In defense efforts, the popular concern over rural defense matters is so great that the cause cannot lie with disinterest. On the other hand, the county organization is well established. Failure to reach all the people lies in the machinery between the county organization and the people themselves. Either the personnel responsible for developing the community organization has failed adequately to function, or for different reasons the wardens did not cover their areas. In the latter case, the reason lies either in the nature of the settlement, which sometimes makes for difficulties of communication, or in the social divergence of the population which inhibits intercourse.

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## ORGANIZATION OF WAR ACTIVITIES

Tulare County has organized emergency preparation rather intensively. On the county level the major work has been done by agencies of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, especially the Agricultural Adjustment Agency and the Extension Service, by the Tulare County Defense and Disaster Council, and by a few other private or special organizations such as the Red Cross and the Farm Bureau. The War Board and the Defense and Disaster Council have been the two main integrating agencies. The former has to do chiefly with wartime problems of agricultural production, and the latter has to do with special activities designed to alleviate conditions in case of enemy action.

The major problem faced by the War Board is one created by the curtailment of farm-labor supply and to this it has devoted most of its attention. To serve farm-labor supply problems a subcommittee on labor was organized. Originally under the now inactive Agricultural Planning Committee, the labor subcommittee was later sponsored by the War Board, while at the time the field work was done it had recently been converted into the Agricultural Manpower Commission with direct line relationship through the Employment Service. The second problem of the War Board has been to pass judgment on requests for priorities for farming equipment and to publicize policies and procedures. The War Board has also acted in an advisory capacity to the draft boards on the question of deferment for farmers and farm laborers wherever such advice has been sought. Among other activities, it has assisted in the evacuation of Japanese from the area.

Of the several agricultural agencies, the Extension Service has been most active in those problems that are the subject of this report. The Farm Advisor has largely been responsible for setting up fire-fighting units, establishing the State Militia, developing a salvage program, and in various educational activities.

The Tulare County Defense and Disaster Council is organized to cover all rural areas and works in close cooperation with the defense councils from the seven incorporated cities. The several units are using the same control centers and, in general, they follow the same pattern of organization. Yet each is set up independently. This degree of cooperation has been augmented by the fact that both the Visalia City and Tulare County organizations employ the services of the same coordinator. County-wide coordination and cooperation with a maximum of local autonomy has been the organizational watchword of those responsible for establishing the council in Tulare County.

The County Council has an executive committee consisting of 14 members, made up of 2 members of the Board of Supervisors, the Coordinator, the District Attorney, the Assistant Superintendent of Schools, and representatives of each of the 7 communities. This is an advisory council. There is also a group without formal designation which assembles at the control center in times of disaster. It includes the ranking officials of the several major units within the Council. At the control center they are in a position to direct the disaster-relief activities for the county. In this group are included the heads of the air-raid warning system, the road-repair crews, the ambulance corps, the welfare service, and the like.



The County Defense and Disaster Council is divided into two major sections -- the protective services and the war services. Under the former heading are included air-raid warning, aircraft warning service, fire protection, road repair, demolition and decontamination, medical and first aid, and public-utilities services. Under war services are the following: Publicity, rationing, nutrition, health and medical care, salvage, welfare and child care, evacuation, and war saving. Each of these units has a special committee and carries on activities which in large part will be described below.

The Red Cross is organized to assist in case of disaster. Details of the relationship between the Defense Council and the Red Cross have apparently not been satisfactorily worked out but an effort is being made to bring Red Cross activities under the jurisdiction of the civilian defense program. The Red Cross has several separate chapters within the county. This increases the problem of coordination on a county-wide basis. However, a liaison officer has been appointed to establish relations with the Civilian Defense Council and the six local committees (which correspond roughly to the six incorporated towns having Red Cross units). The Red Cross has undertaken to provide food, clothing, and shelter for both local war victims and evacuees from urban centers. The Red Cross, of course, continues to perform the emergency functions which are its usual province.

## PRODUCTION MEASURES

### Farm-Labor Activities

Concern over the possibility of a shortage of farm labor began as early as June 1941, at which time the labor planning committee first met. Since then it has met about twice a month and though there has been change in name and sponsorship there has been little shift in either its personnel or its emphasis. The committee was originally attached to the Land Use Planning Committee, later to the Agricultural Planning Committee, then to the County War Board. Just prior to field investigations the labor subcommittee was changed to the Agricultural Manpower Commission. The primary effect of this last shift was to increase the status of the U. S. Employment Service representative on the committee to bring about a more direct relationship with the War Manpower Commission and, specifically, to mobilize the facilities of local chambers of commerce to implement the recruitment of volunteer labor for the fall harvest. It is made up of about 30 persons, including the members of the local committees and ranking officials in the county such as the Farm Advisors, AAA chairman, manager of the local U. S. Employment Service office, and County Labor Coordinator. An executive committee to the Manpower Commission is a smaller policy-making group.

Late in the spring of 1942 community labor supply committees were established in 11 of the 14 recognized Agricultural Adjustment Agency districts. According to the minutes of the Farm Labor Subcommittee of May 18, the duties of these committees were to be as follows:



- "1. Survey needs of district and report week by week.
- "2. Develop contact with farmers.
- "3. Develop publicity which applies to district on use of labor.
- "4. Registration of high schools and city people willing to work in agriculture.
- "5. Act as advisory contact with field man of Employment Service, Chamber of Commerce Secretary, County Labor Coordinator.
- "6. Assist in organization of cooperative crews and exchange of labor.
- "7. Coordinate actions with County War Labor Supply Committee.
- "8. Educate employers on efficiency in use of labor and to maintain most favorable relations between employer and employee."

In effect, these committees are to act as a local clearing house for labor and labor problems and to organize the movement of workers from one area to another. It is generally recognized that they have not been very successful in fulfilling these functions. In an interview with the chairman of the local Chamber of Commerce, acting in this labor-clearance capacity, it was learned that only two or three referrals had been made. This is true despite the fact that there has been an honest attempt to coordinate the activities of these committees with the work of the U. S. Employment Service. The local Chamber of Commerce chairman acted as an official U. S. Employment Service representative, without compensation. These 11 community committees are now considered a part of the Agricultural Manpower Commission.

Another effort to solve the labor problem was made at the specific suggestion of representatives of the Farm Bureau Federation and the Associated Farmers. These two organizations thought that a county labor coordinator could go far toward solving the critical labor situation. They requested that such a person be established on the county pay roll and said they would cover all additional expenses for travel and the like until the value of his work had been determined. After operating a while under this plan the two organizations requested that the county take over full responsibility for the labor coordinator, and this was done. The labor coordinator "beats up the bushes for workers. He operates both within and outside of the county, pointing out to laborers places where work is available." Thus the coordinator serves rather as a labor agent. He does not make any direct placements for workers except that occasionally he sends groups directly to the larger ranches in the county. His success has been mainly due to the relationship he established with the laboring population while he was a public welfare agent.

It might be said that one of the major benefits derived from the long standing labor committee has been a greater mutual understanding between the farmers of the county and the U. S. Employment Service. A member of a local labor supply committee pointed out that one of his colleagues blamed the farmers for not making proper use of the U. S. Employment Service, whereas this member feels that "a little more education on both sides and they will get along all right." The Farm Advisor, too, feels that the degree of understanding and sympathy between farmers and the U. S. Employment Service has increased a great deal. This was evident at one of the meetings, where the discussion centered around methods by which the Employment Service could assist the farmers and the legal limitation of that assistance.

The Farm Advisor's office claims to have made a consistent effort to get local neighborhood groups to cooperate in the use of labor. He himself pointed out cases where such cooperation and generally enlightened labor hiring practices had proved highly beneficial to individual farm operators, and was paying dividends not only in higher efficiency among the workers but actually in lower wages and faster harvesting. These cases are, however, an exception to the general hiring practices found throughout the county and no effort has been made to institutionalize cooperative use of labor crews.

Of the 42 farm operators interviewed, 9 were aware that some organization was attempting to solve the labor problem, but of these 9 only 4 knew of the Community Labor Supply Committees or the clearing houses through the Chambers of Commerce. 2/ The other 5 referred to the activities of the Farm Bureau Federation, or the Associated Farmers, or the Olive Growers' Association. The other farm operators either said that they did not know of any such activity or said flatly that there were none. Almost all of the farm operators are depending on their regular sources of labor supply, 17 saying that they expected to use transients and 21 that they would obtain local workers. The farm operators therefore do not seem to have a psychology ready to undertake special and emergency measures to fulfill their labor needs.

That the labor situation is not as acute as has been reported from other areas is widely admitted by officials in the county, and the generally successful completion of the large harvest of raisins has tended to substantiate this. No concerted effort has been made to press volunteers into service in the county, the general feeling being that such voluntary labor crews should be called upon only when the emergency becomes acute and other measures have failed. Officials think that the immediate problem is the independent and unresponsive attitude of the laborers, who, they claim, frequently fail to show up.

#### Farm Machinery

The War Board has publicized the need for maintaining all farm equipment in good repair but no very positive program either for equipment maintenance or the cooperative use of farm machinery has been undertaken. The War Board chairman thought that the local situation made it impossible to have sharing arrangements in the use of machinery since farmers need the equipment at the same time. The schedules taken from 42 farmers in the county disclose that only two knew of formalized sharing arrangements. (Table 2.) One was between a group of brothers and the other between clients of the Farm Security Administration. Many operators, however, regularly borrow or rent equipment from their neighbors, 32 reporting such practices. It would appear therefore that cooperative use of farm equipment can be and is being made. Apparently no effort is being made toward institutionalizing and generalizing such practices.

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2/ See Table 1.

Table 1.- Sources of labor

	Primary source 1/		Secondary source 2/	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Local emergency measures	1	2	1	3
Regular measures				
Transients	17	31	4	10
Local workers	21	39	4	10
Crews furnished by others	11	20	1	3
Agencies				
U. S. Employment Service	1	2	5	12
Private agency	0	0	2	6
No source indicated				
No source known	1	2	22	56
Needs no labor	2	4	-	-
Total responses 3/	54	100	39	100

1/ Answers to question 10a, "How do you go about getting labor?"

2/ Answers to question 10b, "Is there any other way to get it?"

3/ Farmers could make more than one response to either question.

Table 2.- Emergency sources of farm equipment known to farmers interviewed 1/

Arrangement	Number of	Proportion of
	reports	farmers
	No.	Pct.
Use of neighbors' equipment		
Borrowed	27	65
Rented	5	12
Sharing arrangements	2	5
Commercial agency	2	5
No source or no need	6	14
Total	42	100

1/ Answers to the questions 9a and 9b-- "Is there any arrangement by which you can trade the use of farm machinery?" and "When you need extra equipment, how do you manage to get it?"

#### Other Production Measures

Agricultural agencies have had to perform many other war services not directly involving rural participation. The Agricultural Adjustment Agency, the Farm Advisor, and the Agricultural Commissioner have been responsible for carrying out the order regarding the production of raisins and issuing permits to allow farmers to sell grapes for other purposes. The



Farm Advisor and other agencies have been responsible for handling the transfer of property of evacuated Japanese. The members of the War Board in general and, more specifically, the Farm Advisor have cooperated with the Selective Service Boards in their requests for advice on deferment from draft of farmers and other agricultural workers.

## RURAL WAR PROGRAMS

### Air-Raid Warning System

The air-raid warning service is set up under the Tulare County Defense and Disaster Council on the block plan. There are 13 judicial townships in the county each of which has a chief air-raid warden. The chief has under him several senior wardens and each of these has several junior wardens. In some communities the chief air-raid warden has an advisory committee to assist him. In all cases the chief air-raid warden is either the ranking police officer (constable) or is appointed by him. The line of command down which an air-raid alarm is supposed to go under the coordinated system in Tulare County is as follows: From the San Francisco police to the Fresno police to the Visalia police. From the Visalia police it is sent to the constables where there are no incorporated towns, or to the chiefs of police of incorporated towns in each of the several judicial townships. Where the warning goes to the chief of police, he forwards it to the constable for each of the outlying rural areas as well as to his own air-raid chief. From the constables the warning goes to the chief air-raid wardens, thence to the senior wardens, the junior wardens, and the individual households.

Considerable variation in the organization of this set-up is allowed on the township level. In Tipton, Pixley, and Earlimart, sparsely populated localities with few telephones, a number of townspeople were appointed senior wardens, with the expectation that they would drive through the rural localities carrying the alarm. In Pixley the constable has largely by-passed the hierarchical organization and deals directly with the junior wardens themselves. In Lindsay, where a chief air-raid warden was appointed by the constable, this chief serves very little function, as the constable tends to go directly to his senior wardens.

The air-raid wardens are supposed to have had training in handling incendiary and gas bombs and to have had first-aid courses. Most of this training was done in a series of meetings held early in the year. The first-aid courses were usually given by local persons; sometimes by local school teachers who had just completed the Red Cross first-aid course themselves. The training may therefore be considered rather inadequate. Probably a rather small proportion of persons have received training.

In general, the air-raid warning system has been kept separate from all other activities and no general functions have been placed upon the wardens. They have been requested to take around a questionnaire that calls for the number and description of persons in the several households, the available material for bomb and fire protection, the available fire arms and ammunition, water supply, and other pertinent information. The coordinator

of the Defense Council claims that he has flatly balked at the use of the air-raid warning system for other purposes, as he considers that it was developed for use in emergency situations only. In particular, he mentioned refusal to use the system for the drive to get pledges for the buying of war bonds. Claims that the organization had been used for private political purposes were made but no substantiation of these was found and the Defense Council appears to be free of the taint of political action. A change in coordinator during the summer of 1942 called forth some partisan feeling but apparently did not upset the generally smooth functioning of the organization.

Test alarms have been attempted several times. Two of these have been on a county-wide basis and a few within the city of Visalia. The coordinator feels that the control center for the latter organization is rather well developed, but that for the county-wide council is not yet perfected. To avoid the costs of long-distance calls, test runs on a county-wide basis have not been reported back to the central control center but only to each of the township centers, and therefore a full test has never been staged. In these tests, an air-raid warden, after receiving the alarm, was supposed to cover the area of his block and report back to his immediate superior. He was also supposed to report an imaginary disaster occurring within his block to give the personnel at the control center practice in allocating their emergency squads. The coordinator thought that most of the people could be warned of an air raid in less than an hour's time. Chief wardens seemed to recall only one such test run, suggesting that one county test was completely unsuccessful. One chief air-raid warden felt that his subordinates had performed rather well in the single test which he recalled, but did not give any specific statement as to the time required to contact all wardens and auxiliary police. Another chief warden said that the results of the test blackout which he recalled were "very satisfactory" except for difficulties in one small community where disagreement between the senior warden and the telephone operator resulted in a breakdown of the line of communication.

Sixty-one percent of the persons interviewed know who their air-raid warden is or where he may be located. <sup>3/</sup> The great variation in awareness is found when we separate these schedules by communities, with as much as 85 percent correct responses in Dinuba as against only 20 percent in Earlimart. Many factors contribute to the relatively poor showing of Earlimart in contrast with the other communities. In the first place, Earlimart is in no sense a self-sustaining community, for the population is highly dependent upon the city of Delano in the bordering county. In the second place, the constable who acts as chief air-raid warden does not live in Earlimart but in another neighboring community, Pixley. The sparse settlement in the Earlimart locality resulting from the large units and the large proportion of absentee

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<sup>3/</sup> Schedules were taken from 80 persons in the county, divided equally between the communities of Earlimart, Lindsay, Woodlake, and Dinuba. For this and following data see Table 3.

Table 3.— Awareness and knowledge of emergency measures

Persons reporting awareness and knowledge of:														
Number of schedules		Air-raid warden		Fire warden		Volunteer fire company		Scrap collection		Means of obtaining priority		Protest of unfair prices		
No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	
All persons	80	100	49	61	23	29	21	26	33	5	6	19	24	
Districts														
Earlmarl	20	100	4	20	5	25	8	40	11	55	3	15	4	20
Lindsay	20	100	12	60	4	20	0	0	3	15	0	0	5	25
Woodlake	20	100	16	80	8	40	7	35	3	15	0	0	2	10
Dinuba	20	100	17	85	6	30	6	30	9	45	2	10	8	40
Nationality														
American	65	100	42	65	20	31	17	26	23	35	5	8	9	14
Foreign-born	15	100	7	47	3	20	4	27	3	20	0	0	2	13
Sex														
Male	28	100	17	61	10	36	10	36	15	54	5	18	4	14
Female	52	100	32	62	13	25	11	21	11	21	0	0	7	13
Membership														
No membership	38	100	15	39	5	13	6	16	10	26	1	3	5	13
Defense org. only	8	100	6	75	3	38	1	13	3	38	0	0	2	25
Nondefense org.	34	100	29	85	15	44	14	41	13	38	4	10	14	33
Occupation														
Famer	42	100	32	76	17	40	14	33	18	43	5	12	11	26
Nonfarmer	38	100	17	45	6	16	7	18	8	21	0	0	8	21



operators contributes to the poor showing. It is not likely that personality factors can be held accountable for the situation in Earlimart for the chief air-raid warden is very enthusiastic about civilian defense and is proud of innovations which he has made in the set-up. Furthermore, as his son is the coordinator for the County Defense Council, his relationships with the Visalia office is good. Persons having membership in some organization, either special organizations created for war emergencies or the normal social clubs in the community, show a much higher degree of awareness of their air-raid wardens than do those who have no such affiliation (83 percent as against 39 percent). Similarly, those persons in the rural population who are not members of farm operators' families had a considerably poorer showing with regard to the air-raid warden question (45 percent as against 76 percent).<sup>4/</sup> Finally, the difference between responses of American and foreign-born was significantly great (65 percent as against 47 percent). On the other hand, men and women show virtually the same proportion of correct responses to the air-raid warden question (61 percent and 62 percent respectively).

Of the 80 persons interviewed, 43 remembered having been visited by their air-raid wardens (54 percent) with an average number of about 1 1/2 visits per person reporting (table 4). Here again considerable variation between communities was noted. Eighty-five percent of those interviewed in Dinuba recalled visits by their warden, 70 percent in Lindsay, 55 percent in Woodlake, and but 5 percent in Earlimart. Breaking down the figures for remembered air-raid warden visits by occupation and nationality, we arrive at a partial explanation for the difference in awareness shown by these groups. Only 39 percent of the nonfarmer group remembered visits as against 67 percent among the farmers, and only 47 percent of the foreign-born persons remembered visits as against 55 percent of the American-born group. The fact of an air-raid warden making a call on a farmer is important to that farmer's awareness of the system (table 5). Of those who recalled being visited by their wardens, 95 could accurately name their air-raid warden or indicate his dwelling, as against 22 percent of those who had not been or could not recall being visited by their warden.

#### Fire-Fighting Organization

The fire-fighting program in Tulare County has involved three separate organizations. The first is the cooperative arrangement between the county fire department and the several cities of the county to handle the fires in suburban areas. The second is the 22 fire organizations in the little towns scattered throughout the county. These are manned by town dwellers and organized entirely by the State Division of Forestry. The third consists of farm fire-fighting crews. All the rural farming districts are covered by volunteer crews of from 10 to 12 men. These were organized cooperatively by the Farm Adviser and the State Division of Forestry during the winter of 1941-42, and as they deal with the rural people exclusively are the ones that interest us here.

<sup>4/</sup> Forty-two of the 80 schedules were taken from operators of farms or members of their families. Of the remaining 38, 33 were farm laborers, 1 was unemployed, another a truck driver, a contractor, a school superintendent, and a landlord. There were 6 laborers in Dinuba, 9 in each of the other three communities.

Table 4.- Remembered air-raid warden visits

	Number of Schedules		Persons remembering visits		Visits reported	Average visits per person reporting
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Ave.
All persons	80	100	43	54	65	1.51
Districts						
Earlimart	20	100	1	5	1	1.0
Lindsay	20	100	14	70	24	1.7
Woodlake	20	100	11	55	14	1.3
Dinuba	20	100	17	85	26	1.5
Occupation						
Farmer	42	100	28	67	46	1.6
Nonfarmer	30	100	15	39	19	1.3
Nationality						
American	65	100	36	55	58	1.6
Foreign-born	15	100	17	47	7	1.0
Membership						
No membership	38	100	15	40	18	1.2
Defense org. only	8	100	5	63	7	1.4
Nondefense org.	34	100	23	67	41	1.8

The farm fire fighters, organized along block-system lines, consist of 98 fire crews. Each of these has a leader and assistant leader and 10 or 12 men. The complete organization includes over 1,300 farm people. Two training meetings were held for each crew with a representative from the Extension Service and one from the Division of Forestry in attendance at each meeting. Separate meetings before and after these crew meetings were held for the leaders. In this way about 200 meetings were held. After organization was completed, the entire roster was turned over to the Division of Forestry, under which it now functions. No equipment was furnished by the county, but the farm crews themselves acquired such back pumps and other fire-fighting equipment as they could. One case was cited wherein a community fire crew actually assembled a pumping truck.

The Extension Service personnel, assisted by the local constables, selected crew leaders. Every effort was made to avoid conflict with other block organization personnel. The leader assisted in setting up a list of from 10 to 15 people who might serve as firemen. A letter was sent to each of these persons. Almost everyone who was asked to serve came to the first meeting, but it was necessary to decline those who already served in capacities with conflicting duties. Recently the fire crews were brought partly under the direction of the constables in order to tie them more closely to the Civilian Defense organization.

Table 5.- Awareness and knowledge of emergency measures among persons remembering air-raid warden visits

		Persons reporting awareness and knowledge of:												
Number of schedules		Air-raid warden		Fire Warden		Volunteer fire company		Scrap collection		Means of obtain- ing priority		Protest of un- fair prices		
No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	
Remembering visits	43	100	41	95	16	37	10	23	15	35	2	5	13	30
Not remember- ing visits	37	100	8	22	7	19	11	30	11	30	3	8	6	16

Table 6.- Awareness and knowledge of emergency measures among persons who know their air-raid wardens

		Persons reporting awareness and knowledge of:											
Number of schedules	Fire warden	Volunteer fire company		Scrap collection		Means of obtain- ing priority		Protest of un- fair prices					
		No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.				
Know air-raid warden	49	100		20	41	15	31	17	35	3	6	15	31
Do not know air-raid warden	31	100		3	10	6	19	9	29	2	6	4	13



The Division of Forestry personnel are very satisfied with the results of their work in developing these fire crews. The careful records kept by that agency show the frequency and amount of voluntary assistance which has been made available to them. The State ranger reported that farm fire-fighting crews served at 17 different fires. In only one case did the same crew serve on two different occasions, so that a total of 16 crews was involved, including at least 118 men and 108 man-hours of fire-fighting time. These 16 crews functioned in 8 judicial townships. Aside from this officially reported assistance, the State ranger thought that the volunteer crews had put out many fires before they were ever reported. He considers the educational effects of establishing these crews as having been mainly responsible for the exceptionally small number of fires during the 1942 season.

Forms were sent to 6,000 rural persons through the firemen as follows: The Farm Fire Protective Survey, a questionnaire on the availability of emergency water (both published by the California Extension Service) and a letter explaining the need for the protective measures over the signatures of the State ranger and the assistant county agent. Thus the farmers all received publicity on these programs. The Farm Fire Protection Survey is a check list of hazards around the farm. The emergency water supply is to serve in case electrically pumped water is no longer available. The farm fire-fighting units made up maps showing sources of such water supplies in their districts for use in case electric service was discontinued.

The Assistant Farm Advisor had the following to say about the fire-fighting crews: "I would say that 30 to 40 of the crews are excellent in organization, equipment, and interest, that 10 to 15 are no good whatsoever, and that the remaining ones are fair and would probably serve well in an emergency. The well-organized groups have functioned on several fires this summer even though it has been a year of exceptionally few bad fires." The farm fire-fighting crews cover the entire county, except for the mountainous area where a special fire-fighting organization of the sparse population has long been in existence. It was stated that ordinarily a better response to the fire-fighting system was received in open country than in the thickly populated fruit-growing area. This is to be expected as there is a similar variation in degree of hazard.

Despite the excellent showing of the fire crews, the rural population is not very aware of their existence (Table 3). For the entire county, only 29 percent knew who their fire warden was and only 26 percent knew that volunteer fire companies existed in their area. Though there is some variation in this awareness by districts, it is not sufficient to be considered significant. Again, the difference between American and foreign-born is very slight. We find, however, that men are consistently more aware of the fire-fighting program than are women, and that farmers are much more aware of it than are rural persons not members of farmers' families. Those persons who know their air-raid warden are usually more aware of the fire-fighting program. (Table 6.)

#### Aircraft-Warning Service

Before the United States entered the war the aircraft-warning service had been so well organized that on the evening of December 7 it was activated.

According to the coordinator of the Defense and Disaster Council this organization is responsible to the Army, and the Army is gradually taking over leadership. He seems personally to approve this move as the volunteer spotters seem dissatisfied, feeling that their work is not appreciated by the military. At the time of study, though there was a separate director and a paid supervisor, the aircraft-warning service was supplied and maintained by the Defense Council, which sees to it that they are properly manned. The supervisor was employed by the county during the difficult summer season.

Originally, 60 spotting posts were established in the county, and although for military reasons the coordinator did not wish to disclose the present figure, he intimated that the normal loss due to failure to man posts and the discontinuance of unnecessary posts had brought the figure to about 50 at the present time. These posts are each manned by between 50 and 150 volunteers, so that close to 5,000 persons are probably involved in this program.

The schedules show that of the 80 rural persons interviewed, 23 (29 percent) were serving on observation posts and 66 (83 percent) are aware of the existence of posts in their neighborhoods (Table 7).

Table 7.- Participation in and knowledge of aircraft-warning service

	Number schedules		Number serving		Number aware	
	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.	No.	Pct.
Earlimart	20	100	8	40	14	70
Lindsay	20	100	7	35	19	95
Woodlake	20	100	7	35	18	90
Dinuba	20	100	1	5	15	75
Total	80	100	23	29	66	82

#### State Militia

The Farm Advisor, in accord with the general Extension Service policy throughout the State, has set up units of the State Militia. The first step in organizing these groups was a county-wide meeting held by the Farm Advisor, calling in all those persons who had shown interest in some kind of military drill. Many of these, for instance, already belonged to unofficial guerrilla organizations which grew up locally. About 50 persons were present at this first meeting. After this, the constables and farm leaders were requested to pick key persons in each rural district, upon whom the duty of calling future meetings was placed. They were given enrollment cards and usually held two separate organizational meetings. In this way 22 companies were started with a combined enrollment of about 1,000. After completion of the organization, the Farm Advisor considered his responsibilities fulfilled and the entire set-up was turned over to the State Department of Military and Veterans Affairs. It was only after they were brought under this Department that any attempt was made to coordinate the several companies.



By and large, the personnel of the State Militia is made up of farm people, either farmers or farm laborers. In the community of Farmersville, one of the local leaders set up a particularly successful company. In this area almost all the residents are farm laborers. The Farm Advisor feels that the organization of the State Militia was an abnormal activity for his office and that, while the farmers approve of their establishing fire-fighting units, they disapproved of involvement in the State Militia. The widespread criticism that the Militia was organized for political purposes was likewise prevalent in Tulare County.

#### Other War Activities

Emergency medical care has been set up under a dual but coordinated program. The County Health Director is the chairman of the medical committee while the Red Cross has a separate organization. As previously stated, the Red Cross has 6 separate chapters within the county. The chairman of the Red Cross has held from 7 to 10 meetings with each of the 6 local committees in order to establish the organization of units to provide food, clothing, and shelter for victims of local disasters. Three mobile units with station wagons and 2 ambulance crews have been recruited and trained. The Red Cross has conducted courses in first aid which were attended by most of the rural and urban air-raid wardens and auxiliary policemen. This course included the Office of Civilian Defense requirements of 10 hours of first aid, 3 hours of fire defense, 5 hours of gas protection, 2 hours of practical training, and 5 hours of general instruction.

Plans are under way to establish local-disaster centers in each of the communities directly under the Civilian Defense Council, but these have not proceeded very far, probably because of a change in the county medical director and the fact that no public funds were allocated to this emergency project. Although a liaison officer had been appointed to work between the Civilian Defense Council and the Red Cross chapters of the county no general agreement for working relations seems to have been established. The coordinator felt that the Red Cross should be brought into the Defense Council as a single unit under its general control. There seems to be no local recognition of the nation-wide agreement between the Red Cross and the Defense Council, generally found in use in the counties of California.

The welfare committee of the Defense Council is under the chairmanship of the County Welfare Director. This unit was not organized extensively on a community basis, but its chairman thinks that it has a comprehensive picture of the housing and feeding facilities throughout the county. The committee made a survey of the available food supplies, especially of such items as milk and butter. It has established a canteen corps. Above all, it has surveyed the available housing facilities and knows where there are kitchens designed for large-scale feeding, and has made arrangements for their use. No attempt has been made to canvass private housing as the committee is operating under the philosophy that public facilities should be exhausted before private homes are to be used. The general assumption is that no private housing will be needed and that such institutions as schools, churches, and lodges will be adequate.



Road repair, demolition, and decontamination have been brought under one committee which is manned by the county road crews. In this way approximately 100 men experienced in road repair and demolition are placed under the direction of the county surveyor, who has had experience in these activities. A special course in decontamination was all that was necessary to complete their usefulness in this coalition committee.

A utilities committee has been set up under the direction of the local head of one of the utility companies. One official was made responsible for organizing the unit, while two of his assistants, who are younger and more active, are to perform the actual services in time of disaster.

#### EDUCATIONAL MEASURES

Probably the most comprehensive educational activity carried on by the Home Demonstration Agent is her program "Adjusting the Home to War Conditions." She has met with each of the 15 Farm Home Department groups to discuss this program, which advises women on conservation measures, economies and the like. She has met with each of them to discuss blackouts and to demonstrate blackout materials. She has held 6 meetings in as many locations on educational activities connected with the fire fighting, including a course on water purification, fireproofing clothing, and feeding fire fighters. These last programs were held in conjunction with the Red Cross and the feeding fire-fighters program was especially designed to serve Red Cross needs in connection with their canteen aid program. This training reached about 125 persons in the county. The Home Demonstration Agent is responsible for placing before the farm women the publications of the Office of Price Administration on ceiling prices and on the meaning of price control.

The War Board has put the standard publicity material into the hands of the local newspapers. The Defense Council coordinator has launched a 6-point publicity program. The status of each of these at the end of 1942 was as follows:

- (1) Releases to the newspaper have regularly been made, and have received careful attention.
- (2) A regular radio program was launched some 13 weeks before the field work under the title, "Tri-County Civilian Defense Forum." This program, broadcast from Visalia, was designed to cover Tulare, Fresno, and Kings Counties. At first it consisted of a 15-minute talk but it was so successful that the time allotment was doubled. Content and method of presentation are varied from week to week. The program covers all phases of Civilian Defense work, sometimes by question-answer programs, at others by symposiums or formal speakers. At the last two radio programs the Council offered to send a copy of the recent publication "What Can I do?" to all who requested it. Results were considered gratifying by the coordinator. Requests came from as far away as Oregon and San Diego. Both the radio time and the speakers are furnished without cost to the County Defense Council.

- (3) Bulletin boards have been installed in each city and interesting material displayed on them.
- (4) Public information booths are being planned for each community. It is intended to have a volunteer at each bulletin board during the busy hours who can answer questions on civilian defense matters and perhaps sell war bonds and stamps.
- (5) Posters that are sent from the Civilian Defense headquarters are set up at conspicuous places.
- (6) All publicity materials are passed on to the constables and chiefs of police of the several cities for general word-of-mouth publicity.

#### OTHER WARTIME ACTIVITIES

##### War Bond Pledge Drive

A universal feeling of dissatisfaction with the war bond pledge program was observed in the county. The reasons seem to have been that the campaign was not well coordinated, that the materials required were not received when needed, that it came at a bad time relative to farming operations, and that it was not adjusted to the farmer's individual program.

The American Legion did not handle the bond drive in Tulare County as it did in many places. Rather, it was set up in the different communities by different persons with only slight coordination between them. Districts were set up on the basis of the high-school districts and the several school boards were requested to handle the drive. The boundaries between the school districts were not always rigidly adhered to, so that both duplication and omission occurred.

The chairman of one such community drive used the sugar-rationing cards to get the names of all persons who lived in his district. These cards were filled out by volunteer stenographic assistance. The district was then broken up into smaller units corresponding to the grammar school districts, and the members of the school boards were asked to serve as chairmen. They selected personnel to handle the several blocks in their district. The cards (with pertinent data from the sugar-rationing sign-up) were distributed to those persons serving as minutemen, furnishing to them the names and addresses of the people they were to approach. Of the 14 districts in this area, returns were received from only 8. Of the 1,428 families contacted, pledges were received from 504 (35 percent). Of the remaining 924, 311 refused to pledge and 613 were not reached. These figures apply in 8 of the 14 units only. It is certainly necessary to note that 44 percent of this group were not contacted at all and probably a much greater proportion of the 6 units from which no report was received. From this sample of 1,428 families, almost \$100,000 in bond purchases were pledged. This amount may be considered very satisfactory but there is no check on the relationship of pledges to actual purchases. Despite this elaborate arrangement the pledge sheets have not been submitted to any central office but remain in the hands of the local chairman.



## Salvage

A salvage committee has been established under the Civilian Defense Council with a county-wide chairman. He reports that the following salvage program has been carried on. For the last 4 months an average of 1 1/2 tons of paper a day have been collected by the Boy Scouts and the Junior Red Cross. The aluminum drive has netted a total of 4 tons, collected through depots throughout the county. The rubber drive during the last 5 months has netted 1,800 tons; largely responsible for this activity were the oil companies who made ranch-to ranch and house-to-house canvasses. Scrap iron and steel totaled 6,000 tons in the last 5 months. The oil companies made an inventory of scrap on ranches by means of a short questionnaire by the oil companies. County, WPA, and private trucks were used for picking up scrap metals.

Helpful publicity was had through the local papers and the radio and through slides shown in rural theaters. The county chairman says he has found that the only effective means to obtain scrap has been by house-to-house canvass, that in this way the junk dealers are obtaining 300 tons a month and each of the 7 WPA crews a little over 5 tons a day. At present, transportation is the major difficulty in moving the scrap material. The WPA reports from Tulare County showed that 113 tons of metal had been received as donations from 269 donors as of September 1 and that 125 tons had been purchased by the WPA from 236 vendors. These figures refer only to the rural areas as the WPA activities have not been carried on in the cities. Comparative reports were received from the WPA for Tulare, San Joaquin, Sacramento, and Yolo Counties. Of these Tulare stands second only to San Joaquin and first in number of donors and number of vendors. The WPA used post cards in their survey of available scrap but found them virtually useless as the returns averaged less than 5 percent.

The Farm Advisor stated that one of the major difficulties in effective scrap collection was the prejudice among the farmers and other members of the general population toward the junkmen who they think are trying to profiteer on the scrap deal. The Farm Advisor himself sent cards to 200 farmers in a certain district to learn what scrap was available. The results of this test were so unsatisfactory that the use of cards was not continued.

The survey taken from 80 farmers showed that the people are more aware of the service stations in the scrap-collection program than of any other one unit, with 34 (43 percent) indicating that method of scrap disposal. Sixteen (20 percent) of the farmers referred to the salvage depots and 10 (13 percent) to the Government truck. Six persons referred to the Boy and Girl Scouts or other children's activities.

## Rationing

The Defense Council in Tulare County has been responsible for organizing the rationing boards. It appointed members for the 9 rationing boards in the county. Until recently they provided the boards with personnel, supplies, and equipment, but at the time of study the Office of Price Administration had begun to furnish some supplies. At first the coordinator of



the Defense Council was in charge of rationing; later an unpaid Federal Administrator was appointed. On September 1 a paid Office of Price Administration secretary was placed in charge of all matters of price adjustment and rationing.

According to the coordinator of the Defense Council there is a growing fear among the rural population of increased external control of rationing procedure and a limitation of the power of the local boards to act. He believes that the people in Tulare County, and especially the local volunteer officials, are anxious to have the control in their hands because they think they know the conditions and can better judge the justice of individual claims. It appears that the coordinator had especially in mind the rationing of tires.

### PROBLEMS IN RURAL MOBILIZATION

Organizations designed to serve emergency needs resulting from the war have been established for almost every phase of agricultural production and civilian defense but activity awareness remains at a low level. This is especially true of those activities designed to aid in agricultural production. It has been pointed out that only one farmer considered the emergency labor activities as a primary source for his supply of help, and one other considered it a secondary source.

Two causes for this low level of participation and awareness must be mentioned: one lies in the minds of the working farmer and the other in the mode of organization by county personnel. Although labor shortages have been discussed since early spring of 1941, there is actually little real concern among the farm operators and no mental adjustment to the emergency conditions under which they are operating. The fact that only 6 persons mentioned the U. S. Employment Service as a source of workers--either primary or secondary--shows that prejudice and habit are still dominant in their thinking. The frequent specific denial of any interest in machinery-sharing arrangements substantiates this conclusion. Only two such arrangements were reported as known to any of the 42 interviewed farmers--one among brothers and the other among clients of the Farm Security Administration.

On the other hand, the War Board organization designed to serve labor needs does not direct its efforts toward developing the full participation of the farm operator. It remains mainly a county policy organization. Only this year did it make any effort to develop community organizations and these have been of small effectiveness. (It might well be pointed out here that Tulare County, more than most any in the State, is made up of separate and relatively autonomous communities.) The community labor committees have established clearing houses, but these seem to be little known to either the farmers or to the workers. One such clearing house had registered only 2 or 3 applicants for work at the time this study was made, and some were not functioning in this capacity at all. These committees were tied in with the Chambers of Commerce, and few farm operators participated in their formation or functioning. Cooperative farming and labor and machinery sharing were suggested by the Farm Labor Subcommittee, but were never carried out and these forms of action are generally considered not to be feasible under farming conditions in the county.



Knowledge among farm people of the proper methods for obtaining priority ratings on farm equipment other than tires was very low. This suggests again that the War Board has not been sufficiently zealous in its publicity program. The scrap-collection program and the information on methods of protesting price irregularities have reached a wider audience.

Yet highly organized effort is possible in the county under conditions where the rural people recognize the necessity and where vigorous efforts are made by those in charge in the county. More than 1 household in 4 (29 percent) had a member in the Aircraft Warning Service, and among farm operators the proportion was closer to 1 in 2 (45 percent). This service is of no economic advantage to the farmer, is generally considered a nuisance, and is frequently considered useless to the Army by the persons who are serving. Social pressure, the prestige of the military, and the desire of individuals to be of service have made its successful organization possible. It is likewise significant that this service is known to 4 out of 5 rural people (82 percent) -- a considerably larger proportion than were aware of any other emergency war organization. Though the number of people who know about defense organizations is considerably greater than those who know about emergency production measures, recognition is far short of being universal.

Reason for the failure of the defense organizations to achieve full recognition does not lie with the county organizational efforts. Paid administrators, participation by leading citizens in the community, and official sanction have all led to a very highly organized county office. The difficulty lies, rather, with the efforts in the communities. The county Civilian Defense organization has established the principle of "a high degree of cooperation with maximum local autonomy." This has led in some cases to very poor local organizations while in others the good results were obtained. Thus in one community only 20 percent of the people knew correctly their air-raid wardens whereas in another 85 percent knew theirs. This is a far greater difference in awareness than is exhibited between American and foreign-born, between farmers and nonfarmers, or between organization members and non-members. Furthermore, that community which was low in awareness of air-raid wardens is high in awareness of volunteer fire-fighting companies, which suggests that the cause does not lie with the people. It would appear, therefore, that the principle of local autonomy can be carried so far as to render the organization ineffectual in certain areas.

Although the differences between communities proved greater than between other groupings on an economic or social basis, these latter differences are not insignificant. In rural society, foreign-born persons, non-farming residents of the open country, and persons without memberships in associations are usually of lower economic and social status than their respective opposites. Therefore, it is a significant fact that these groups show consistently less awareness than do the American born, the farm operator, and the member of civic and farm organizations. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that these people tend to be excluded from participation, for not only do a smaller proportion report visits by their air-raid wardens but they consistently report fewer visits per person reporting visits at all. The defense activities of the county therefore tend to draw class lines which reduce their effectiveness.



In general, the war activities are failing to reach all the people because of poor local organization and the maintenance of certain habits of mind and action which hampers their full development.



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